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Abstract 
 
There exists the notion in African philosophy that to be regarded as a person, an individual 
needs to be morally excellent, and the way to secure this moral excellence is through 
maintaining good relations with others, meaning that one has duties directed towards 
others. This is the view which was popularized in philosophy by Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) and 
is known as the communitarian normative conception of person. Proponents of this view 
tend to stress the importance of the community in facilitating the development of the 
individual. Kwame Gyekye (1997) argues against Menkiti for the latter’s over-
exaggeration of the role of the community, and calls him a radical communitarian for 
doing so. However, Gyekye ends up committing to the same error as the radicals. As a 
result, a debate has ensued regarding the appropriate characterization of the 
community/individual relationship, with the above-mentioned philosophers, classic 
communitarians, favouring the community over the individual. However, this paper seeks 
to argue that this view is unattractive because it faces difficulty in conferring the 
judgement of who counts as a person. Moreover, I argue that this view is open the 
incoherency between moral excellence and adherence to communal values. As a result, I 
seek to defend the limited communitarianism conception of person as it escapes these 
and other difficulties, by positing that persons consist of a metaphysical identity and a 
social identity, and as a result of the former identity preceding the latter identity, certain 
individual rights are inviolable.  
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Introduction  
For African philosophers, the nature of the concept of a person is just as contentious as it 
is for their Western counterparts. The biggest difference, however, between the former 
and the latter is that in African thought, the most vigorous defences of a conception of 
persons are found in the normative arena than in the metaphysical strata. The 
communitarian view of persons is the dominant conception of a person in African 
philosophy. According to Menkiti (1984), a person is an individual who adheres to 
communal norms and seeks to maintain the continuity of the community, even if it means 
sacrificing individual rights in the process. This position, which has come to be known as 
radical or extreme communitarianism, is strongly criticised by proponents of what is 
known as moderate or restricted communitarians. The moderates, according to Kwame 
Gyekye (1997), recognise individual autonomy and the value of the individual in the 
communitarian dispensation. Hence, individual rights are recognised by the moderates as 
necessary to protect the dignity of people. However, Gyekye’s position ultimately leads 
to the same conclusion as the radicals, that when communal and individual rights are 
clashing, it is communal interests which should take precedence. As a result, it seems as 
though there is some philosophical tension in how to account for individual interests in 
the communitarian dispensation. However, this paper seeks to argue not only that 
Limited Communitarianism provides the most defensible characterisation of the 
individual/community relationship, but that it evades some difficulties inherent in the 
older versions of communitarian conceptions of persons. In the first chapter, this paper 
will start by articulating the different conceptions of personhood found in African 
thought. It will then defend the position that any talk of the community metaphysically 
constituting an individual cannot escape making a category mistake. In the second 
chapter, it seeks to outline the debate between the radicals and the moderates and 
display how there is a lack of distinction between the two camps. As a result of this, it 
seems that the tension regarding the characterisation of the relationship between the 
community and the individual persists. In the third chapter, this paper seeks to delineate 
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the normative communitarian conception of persons as found in the literature, and argue 
that this conception faces serious difficulties like how to accurately judge if an individual 
truly deserves the status of personhood, as well as the difficulty of trying to account for 
the possibility of there being a contradiction between moral excellence and communal 
values. In the final chapter, this essay will explicate the commitments of limited 
communitarianism and how these allow this theory of persons to escape some of the 
difficulties the classic communitarians face, and then defend this theory from the 
objection of what renders it a communitarian account.  
With there being numerous articulations in African thought about how persons 
are viewed, classifying them is not as simple a task as it seems. Didier Kaphagawani (1998) 
provides the first attempt at elucidating on these conceptions of persons and concludes 
that there are three prominent views in African philosophy: the Tempelsian Force thesis, 
Kagame’s Shadow thesis, and Mbiti’s Communalism thesis. Bernard Matolino (2014) 
dismisses the threefold taxonomy, and alongside Polycarp Ikuenobe (2006), advocates for 
a distinction between only two conceptions of persons. Ikuenobe separates between the 
descriptive metaphysical, and the normative conceptions, while Matolino demarcates the 
metaphysical from the communitarian conceptions. However, Matolino opposes 
Ikuenobe’s reference to the metaphysical conceptions of persons as descriptive as this 
misleads the reader into thinking the normative views of persons are more important 
than the metaphysical views. But in light of this bone of contention, Oritsigbubemi Oyowe 
(2015) accuses Matolino of the same sleight of hand Ikuenobe is guilty of, when Matolino 
distinguishes the metaphysical from the communitarian conceptions of persons, as if the 
latter – Matolino – is charging the communitarian views of persons of not being 
metaphysical. In fact, what Matolino does is charge communitarians like Placide Tempels 
(1959), John Mbiti (1970), and Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) with committing a category mistake 
when they proffer the community as an ontological constituent of an individual. However, 
Oyowe does not view communitarians as guilty of this mistake. This is the debate that I 
seek to delineate in the first chapter of this document. Moreover, in this chapter I seek to 
defend the position that communitarians are guilty of a category mistake, which means 
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that talk of the community constituting the individual must be limited to the normative 
arena. 
It is in this arena where Menkiti’s view of persons has been argued by philosophers 
like Polycarp Ikuenube (2006) and Kwasi Wiredu (2008) to have significance. In the second 
chapter, I explicate Menkiti’s account of persons and then show how Kwame Gyekye’s 
(1997) response to it gave rise to the prominent debate in communitarianism: the debate 
on how to characterise the relationship between the community and the individual. In 
this chapter, I show how Menkiti (1984) proffers an account which favours the community 
and abrogates the rights of individuals. I then show how Gyekye argues against this view 
for exaggerating the role of the community and not recognising individuality. Gyekye 
(1997) then offers to remedy Menkiti’s shortfalls by providing his version of moderate 
communitarianism. However, in doing so, Gyekye opens himself to a lot of criticism 
rendering his account not very distinct from Menkiti’s radical communitarianism. 
Mostamai Molefe (2016) argues that Gyekye’s charge that Menkiti is a radical 
communitarian is unfounded. This is because, Molefe agrues, Menkiti could be read 
charitably to be favouring a communitarian account which posits duties to protect the 
dignity of persons, as opposed to rights. If this is the case, then it is not clear how Menkiti 
is radical. Furthermore, Olanipekun Famakinwa (2010) argues that mere recognition of 
individual rights is consistent with the position endorsed by the so-called radicals, thus 
making the distinction further unclear. Moreover, Oritsigbubemi Oyowe (2013) is of the 
view that Gyekye’s attempted solution to balance the individual/community relation is to 
restate the problem than resolve it, and Matolino (2009) exposes that Gyekye is 
ultimately committed to the same position of abrogating individual rights when the 
community is threatened. As a result of these criticisms, I hope to show in this chapter 
that both the radicals and moderates are committed to the same side of the debate, 
leaving open what the best way to characterise the individual/community relation. 
Mpho Tshivhase (2013) argues that the nature of personhood in the normative 
arena is moral excellence, and the means to acquire this personhood is through 
maintaining good relations. This is a view fervently supported by Ikuenobe (2006) and 
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Wiredu (2008, 2009) such that these two authors view the communitarian conception of 
persons as one which a person just is a morally excellent individual. They also argue that 
to achieve this moral excellence is to abide by communal dictates, which Wiredu argues 
to be the maintenance of good social relations, the reciprocation of duties or rights, or 
both, and the pursuing of community member interest. However, having showed this, 
this paper then moves to argue, in this third chapter, that this classic communitarian view 
of persons faces three serious challenges ranging from the ‘inauthentic moralists’ 
difficulty, which poses a challenge of how to accurately judge individuals as qualifying to 
be persons. The second challenge is how this theory can account for the apparent 
incoherency of committing to moral excellence and adhering to communal values. The 
final challenge this paper exposes is the one of balancing individual rights with duties. 
Following these challenges, this paper then argues that limited communitarian is 
the most defensible conception of persons as this view escapes the above-mentioned 
challenges. Limited communitarianism, as coined by Matolino (2014), argues that a 
person has a metaphysical and social identity. The metaphysical identity coincided with 
the African metaphysical conception of persons, and it is all an individual needs to count 
as a person. However, in order to fully function in a community, it is important that one 
is a particular type of person, and this specification is captured by one’s social identity. As 
a result of this separation, Matolino’s view escapes the first two challenges exposed in 
chapter three as limited communitarianism does not require individuals to be morally 
excellent in order to qualify as persons. This defence forms the bulk of the fourth chapter 
of this document. Moreover, I continue to argue that limited communitarianism’s 
characterisation of the individual/community relation is favourable as it seeks to 
reciprocate duties an individual has towards others, with certain inviolable individual 
rights. Finally, I conclude by showing that even though the limited communitarian favours 
certain individual rights, it is still consistent with communalism. The fifth and final chapter 
is the conclusion of all these chapters. 
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Chapter 1 
Communitarianism, Personhood, and Metaphysics: An Analysis 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to articulate the different conceptions of persons as found in African 
thought. Furthermore, I defend the position that to posit that the community constitutes 
individuals ontologically, is to commit a category mistake. As a result, I argue that the best 
way to characterize these conceptions is to demarcate between metaphysical and 
normative conceptions.  
1.2 African Conceptions of Personhood   
When it comes to how personhood is understood in African Philosophy, Didier 
Kaphagawani provides the first attempt at clarifying the different ways persons are 
conceived in African Philosophy. In his article, African Conceptions of Personhood and 
Intellectual Identities (1998), he identifies three notions of persons: the Force thesis, the 
Shadow thesis, and the Communalism thesis. Kaphagawani attributes the Force thesis to 
Father Placide Tempels for the latter’s postulations that the Bantu people of the Baluba 
tribe, viewed human beings as ontologically possessing a vital force that plays a definitive 
role in social interaction, where one’s status as a person is reviewed in terms of this force. 
The second thesis is attributed to Alexis Kagame where he proffers that persons possess 
a vital principle known as the shadow as well as another vital principle responsible for 
intelligence. Furthermore, Kagame also introduces the ‘heart’ as a person’s personality 
which enables one to be distinguishable from another person. The third thesis, 
communalism, which Kaphagawani attributes to Mbiti, is where persons are thought to 
be constituted by their community.  While it is evident that thinkers like Mbiti and 
Tempels unequivocally assert the persons/community relation as one of constitution, 
other authors claim that persons are “defined” by their communities (Menkiti, 1984), 
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without articulating clearly what “defined” means. That persons are defined by their 
communities could be a general claim purporting to the idea that in order for individuals 
to develop their capacities properly, there needs to be an environing community to 
facilitate such development without which the individual cannot thrive. However, the 
reason why I refer to this claim as general is because it is quite difficult to argue in 
opposition of it, such that even advocates of the liberal individualistic view of persons 
accept it. Thus, it seems redundant to even make this claim unless by “defined”, it is 
meant that persons are constituted by the community. If it is the latter claim which 
communitarians seek to defend, then further clarity is required as to what this 
constitution amounts to. If it means that persons are ontologically constituted by the 
community, then I am of the view that, as this paper will seek to argue below in support 
of Matolino (2014), such claims amount to a category mistake. From the above, it is 
evident that the communitarian view is only but one among a number of views. 
Nevertheless, having provided these distinctions, Kaphagawani does not seem to provide 
clarity on whether there is or may be a relation among these conceptions, or whether 
they are so fundamentally distinct that nothing can be philosophised about their 
relationship.  
Polycarp Ikuenobe (2006) attempts to provide clarity regarding any relationship 
African conceptions of personhood may have by demarcating between the descriptive 
metaphysical view of personhood on one hand, and a normative perspective on the other. 
Ikuenobe claims that: “There are two philosophical conceptions of personhood in African 
thought”, and he notes that the descriptive offers an account of the intrinsic ontological 
nature of a person; “whether he or she is essentially material or immaterial, or whether 
he or she has one or two essential natures” (2006: 117). However, in as much as this 
conception is found in Africa, for Ikuenobe, it is the normative account which closely 
resembles traditional African thought. The rationale for this kind of thinking, Ikuenobe 
postulates, is that the normative conception of persons requires individuals to adhere to 
and meet certain community standards and responsibilities in order to be regarded as 
persons. Regarding these, Ikuenobe claims that, “Such responsibilities may be defined in 
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terms of personal achievements that are worthy of social recognition” (ibid). In addition, 
Ikuenobe posits a relation between the two conceptions such that the descriptive view of 
persons is a necessary feature of the normative view. Moreover, this normative 
conception of persons seems resonant with Kaphagawani’s communalism thesis, raising 
the question of whether there are any other similarities or differences between the two 
authors, and which taxonomy should be adopted.  
In his book, Personhood in African Philosophy (2014), Bernard Matolino attempts 
to answer these questions, and in the process, makes recourse to a category mistake 
charge against communitarians in order to justify, among other things, his own taxonomy. 
Matolino is of the view that the best characterisation of the notion of personhood is 
denoted by the metaphysical conception, and the communitarian conception. He is of the 
view that both Kaphagawani and Ikuenobe are guilty of some conceptual errors resulting 
in their misguided taxonomy. For Matolino, Kaphagawani’s force thesis is a 
misunderstanding of Tempels’ assertions as the former “fails to analyse Tempels’s theory 
to its logical conclusion” (2014: 5). Instead, Matolino understands Tempels’ emphasis on 
force, not as singling out a merely static attribute possessed by individuals, but as pointing 
out a dynamic entity which acquires meaning in how individuals relate with each other in 
the social arena. Furthermore, Matolino construes Tempels as articulating a notion of 
force which increases if one has good relations with others in her community, and 
decreases when communal relations are negative. Thus, one comes to possess more force 
the better one’s communal relations are, and “persons with great force manifest 
themselves as individuals who have an important part to play in communal affairs while 
those who have no or little force, will be confined to lesser roles or be deprived from 
playing any role at all” (Matolino, 2014: 7). Therefore, in light of the above, Matolino 
characterises Kaphagawani’s Tempelsian force thesis as communitarian, making it one 
and the same as Kaphagawani’s communalism thesis.  
Matolino then opts to re-categorise the conception which Kaphagawani attributed 
to Alexis Kagame as the shadow thesis, as falling under the metaphysical category. 
Matolino(2014) claims that the reason for his reclassification is that for Kagame, what 
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counts as constitutive of persons is independent of the community and solely relies on 
ontological features possessed by the individual. The shadow, intelligence, and the heart 
are all features that Kagame offers as belonging to human beings independent of any 
relations. One might question this reclassification and assert that Matolino is begging the 
question by defining metaphysical constituents of a person as independent of the 
community. This objection might claim that in attempting to define what may count as 
metaphysical constituents of a person, Matolino assumes that these constituents are 
those which belong to the individual and not the community without proving this claim, 
and then proceeds to argue that the metaphysical constituents cannot include 
communality as a feature of persons, on the basis of this assumption. In other words, it 
seems as if Matolino has assumed as a premise that which he wants to prove. I lack the 
space to articulate what metaphysics is or may be, neither do I have space to articulate 
on the nature of metaphysical constituents of anything. However, I am not entirely 
convinced in any case by this objection. This is because I am of the view that it is 
reasonable to assume that the community is distinct from an individual, and as a result, 
there are some reasons which account to this metaphysical distinctness. Therefore, if one 
was to investigate and narrate the metaphysical constituents of individuals, it seems they 
have to account for what makes an individual distinct from a community. Thus, if the 
above is true, metaphysical constituents of a person ought to be distinct, and therefore, 
in this regard independent of the community.   
 Thus, if we take Matolino’s analysis seriously, then we have reason to accept that 
Kaphagawani’s conceptions are not threefold but two; the metaphysical (shadow thesis), 
and communitarian (communal and force thesis). Matolino then moves to provide his 
views on Ikuenobe’s taxonomy. The first issue Matolino has with Ikuenobe’s position is 
the latter’s interchanging of the words descriptive and metaphysical, the doing of which 
“misleads thinkers into the conclusion that the communal is more important than the 
descriptivist category” (2014: 29). For Matolino, metaphysical accounts are more 
powerful than descriptivist accounts as the former involves a deeper investigation of 
existence and the nature of existents, while the latter involves a mere narration of what 
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is perceived. Moreover, Matolino asserts that metaphysics is “an exclusive concern of the 
philosopher”, while describing is “just about everyone’s business”, hence why he is of the 
view that interchanging the two is misleading.  
However, these specific comments by Matolino are not warmly received by all. 
Oritsigbubemi Oyowe takes issue with Matolino’s contention against the 
interchangeability of descriptive and metaphysical, and claims that “it is hard to see what 
is misleading or unserious about the claim that philosophers, who identify certain intrinsic 
characteristics that distinguish some entity as persons, are doing work in descriptive, 
rather than revisionary, metaphysics” (2015: 505). However, even from Oyowe’s words 
quoted above, it seems that Matolino is raising a serious point. To “identify certain 
intrinsic characteristics” involves, at least, two processes. The first one involves coming 
up with an account of what it is for something, X, to be of intrinsic feature of another 
thing, Y. The second process would be to then pick out these intrinsic characteristics using 
terms available in the lexicon. The first process usually involves an investigation (for those 
entities whose nature or essence is not directly perceptible) for example, of what it is for 
something to be intrinsic – maybe it is a necessary condition for the obtainment of Y – as 
well as what it is for something to be a feature of another thing, or an investigation of 
when this property instantiates. This process of investigation appears to be more than 
just picking terms which correlate the subject with the object of my perception – mere 
description – it involves the positing of a particular stance on what intrinsic means, and 
backing it with ratiocinative argumentation. This process, is what I, and perhaps Matolino 
as well, envisage philosophers to be doing when identifying “certain intrinsic 
characteristics that distinguish some entity as persons”, and this investigative process 
deserves more the ascription of the category ‘metaphysics’ than ‘descriptive’. It is only 
once this investigative process is done that the secondary process of narrating it assumes.  
For example, if we were to identify what the intrinsic characteristics of water are, 
we would start by defining what is meant by intrinsic. If we conclude that for some 
feature, X, to be intrinsic to Y, is for X to be such that without it, Y fails to exist. Thus, for 
water, physics informs us that it is made up of two hydrogen atoms, and one oxygen atom 
10 
 
(denoted H2O) without any of which water fails to exist. Therefore, following this 
investigation, we can then describe water’s intrinsic characteristics as H2O. In fact, if 
serious thought is put in this example of water, perhaps one can sympathise even more 
with Matolino. It is the case that it has not always been known to people that the intrinsic 
features of water are H2O, as such a discovery is due to the wonderful work of the natural 
sciences, which itself was not been prevalent at one point in time. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to take the view that descriptions of water have existed prior to the methods 
of natural science such that even before it was known that water is H2O, people were 
describing it. Moreover, I posit that those who described water in these ways were 
understood without much confusion and effort, and I am of the view that these 
descriptions can still be used today to pick out water without much complication. Yet, in 
no way does it seem reasonable that these descriptions could have been picking out 
intrinsic features of water, as the latter were only discovered later. Thus, it seems that a 
descriptive account is not necessarily an account of intrinsic features, but a metaphysical 
account of something, by necessity, provides for the intrinsic features of that thing. Hence 
why metaphysical accounts tend to involve rigorous investigations than mere 
observations and narrations. Therefore, to denote this conception of persons as 
descriptive, in my view, is misleading as it opens the possibility that this conception may 
not be referring to intrinsic features of persons whereas the very idea of this conception 
is to provide these intrinsic features qua metaphysical ontology. As a result, if African 
philosophers are to investigate what the intrinsic ontological features of persons amount 
to, then denoting this process as metaphysical seems more accurate than assigning it 
mere descriptive connotations.  
Irrespective of the above, for Oyowe, there is greater controversy in Matolino’s 
specific demarcation of the conceptions of persons to be between metaphysical 
conceptions and communal conceptions, as if to imply that the “communitarian 
proponent of personhood is not engaged in metaphysical inquiry” (2015: 505). This bone 
of contention requires more background than has been provided. To begin with, for 
Matolino, the reason why he does not call the metaphysical view communalist is that the 
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former focuses on individual characteristics of humans as determinants of personhood, 
than the community (2014: 21). He continues to say that the metaphysical thesis as 
posited by him delineates that to be a person, one needs “to be in possession of certain 
complex features” (2014: 23). Moreover, Matolino claims that although he is cognisant of 
the role the community plays in developing these features, “The metaphysical view starts 
with certain characteristics and goes on to explain their status in ethnic ontology” such 
that this view “presupposes that persons are rightful owners of certain characteristics 
which enable them to be communal beings” (2014: 23-24). In other words, in Matolino’s 
view, the community is indeed responsible for developing the features individuals have; 
however, there exists these features on their own before the community can develop 
them. Thus, it is in reference to these features, the ontological constituents of an 
individual, that the metaphysical thesis is born. 
In summary, even though Kaphagawani identifies three conceptions of persons, 
Ikuenobe and Matolino agree that there are only two. However, their agreement stops 
with the number of conceptions because how they refer to these notions differ. While 
Ikuenobe refers to them as the descriptive and normative views on persons, Matolino 
refers to them as the metaphysical and communitarian conceptions of person. The reason 
for this difference is that Matolino is of the view that using the term ‘descriptive’ misleads 
the reader into thinking that the normative view is more important without defending 
this stance. I agree with Matolino as sometimes descriptive accounts are not as thorough 
as metaphysical accounts (see the water example above). Thus, for the rest of this paper, 
I will refer to the one conception of persons as metaphysical. 
1.3 Communitarianism and Metaphysics: Is there a Category Mistake? 
Despite the above, there is a bigger reason why Matolino separates his communal view 
from the metaphysical view of persons; a justification Oyowe does not accept. In his book, 
Matolino (2014) accuses communitarians of committing a category mistake when they 
seek to answer the question of what a person is. For Matolino, “one has committed a 
category mistake when she ascribes, to a certain entity, a property or properties which 
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that entity could not have” (2014: 142). In light of the above, Matolino is of the view that 
when it comes to matters of strict ontological identity, the communitarian thesis is not 
apt to answer such matters and its utility as a theory of persons needs to be limited to 
the socio-ethical arena. To further illustrate his point, Matolino juxtaposes two categories 
which enable us to answer questions related to identifying persons: the “what/how” 
category, and the “why” category. The first category, which includes questions like “what 
is a person? What do persons do? How do persons understand themselves? How do 
persons operate? […] seeks to give certain features about persons as true to all persons. 
It tells us the composition of persons and fixes the kinds of things that they are” 
(Matolino, 2014: 143). The second category, inclusive of questions like “why do persons 
behave the way they do? Why do persons believe in the things they do?” is different from 
the first category, Matolino asserts, because “it seeks to explain how the characteristics 
in category one are animated in the lives of persons. We can say the first category asks 
about the kinds of things that persons are endowed with and the second category shows 
how those endowments translate into certain activities” (ibid). In other words, the first 
category identifies certain characteristics while the second category seeks to explain why 
these characteristics function the way they do.  
In consideration of the above, Matolino asserts that the error communitarians make 
arises when they conflate the two above-mentioned categories. He is of the view that 
communitarians ascribe “descriptive features of sociality to strict issues of identity” 
(2014: 144). Matolino then continues to clarify the category mistake by postulating that 
even within the first category, the what/how category, it is only the ‘what’ questions 
which refer to matters of strict metaphysical identity – not the ‘how’ questions. This is 
because the latter questions presuppose the prior existence of an entity to which these 
questions pertain. Thus, in my understanding, the ‘what’ questions pertain to the nature 
of an entity, and the ‘how’ questions pick out the functionality of that entity in relation to 
its constituents. It is possible for these questions to be related in such a manner that it 
may even appear as though the nature of an entity is its very function, for example, a 
cellphone. However, this still does not mean that the nature and function are the same 
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thing – they do come apart. On one hand, the question “what is a cellphone?” can be 
answered along the lines of “a cellphone is an instrument which reproduces sound 
through satellite connection to facilitate communication at long distances”. On the other 
hand, once properly scrutinized, it becomes evident that the above definition 
presupposes something that has not been defined; the instrument. Thus, on this view, a 
cellphone could just be the assemblage of a glass screen, rubber buttons, a speaker and 
a microphone, into a single entity. Once these pieces are assembled, then sound can be 
reproduced; the call (function) comes after there exists a stand-alone instrument. Thus, 
the instrument and the function come together to form a cellphone.  As a result, 
Matolino’s point is simply that the communitarian is in error when they conflate ‘what’ 
questions with ‘why/how’ questions, hence the category mistake. To understand the 
charge of a category mistake, I am of the view that it is imperative to understand what 
Matolino’s project seems to be. Matolino wants a theory of persons which is 
acknowledges the role of the community in a person’s development, but one which is also 
sensitive to the individual and her capacities (2014: 166). As a result, for him, a person is 
made up of a metaphysical and a social identity. The metaphysical identity includes the 
ontological constituents of all human beings, while the social identity pertains to how 
these constituents develop and function within a social atmosphere. Thus, with this 
demarcation, it becomes understandable how a category mistake arises; if 
communitarians postulate that the community constitutes a person, then such talk, per 
Matolino, ought to be limited to the constitution of a person’s social identity and not her 
metaphysical identity.  
Oyowe strongly disagrees with Matolino and proclaims that communitarians are 
not warranted to be accused of committing a category mistake. Oyowe (2015) is of the 
view that Matolino is not justified to make this claim as the latter has not clearly shown 
that the communitarians “ascribe, to a certain entity, a property or properties which that 
entity could not have”. Instead, Oyowe posits that properties like moral agency and 
sociality (communality) are not features that “persons could not have” (2015: 509). In 
fact, for him, it is perfectly conceivable for persons to be communal in nature (ibid, my 
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emphasis). In other words, Oyowe is arguing that a category mistake has not been 
committed because moral agency and communality are features any individual could 
have. With the operative word being ‘could’, Oyowe is postulating that it is, at the very 
least, imaginable to think of persons as ethical and relational.  
If I have understood Oyowe correctly, then my imagination reflects the thought 
that he has not conceived of Matolino’s argument fully. From my perspective, Matolino’s 
argument is simply the conditional that if persons are defined, as Matolino has argued, in 
a manner which demarcates between that person’s metaphysical and social identities, 
then it is not clear how the community can be a metaphysical ontological constituent of 
persons. Conceived of in another way, Matolino’s claim is that if, when talking about 
persons regarding their metaphysical identity, we are talking about strict ontology, then 
claims of moral agency and communality do not amount to metaphysical ontological 
claims. When making metaphysical ontological claims about persons, such claims pertain 
to the basic features of persons; features without which persons do not exist as corporeal 
entities; intrinsic features of human beings. If the above makes sense, then it is not clear 
that being moral and communal can be viewed in this way. This is because, on one level, 
it is in the nature of these concepts that they refer to behaviour or a way in which 
something can be done. They are normative concepts which makes them prescriptive. It 
is possible for us to speak about morality and communality as metaphysical (more meta-
ethical) concepts divorced from their practical obtainment, the same way we can talk 
about water as purely a concept which is distinct and separable from the tangible, 
colourless, liquid material which comes out of our taps we all know as water. Even if it can 
be debatably acceptable that there is a necessary entailment from the one to the other, 
the concept ‘water’ is still distinguishable from the liquid material ‘water’. Thus, viewed 
as purely concepts qua concepts, morality and communality, just like any other concept, 
are by nature, not the kinds of things which can ontologically constitute any material 
entity like a human being.  
On another level, since the concepts of morality and communality (and water) 
refer to something out there in the world, it is conceivable, according to Oyowe, that the 
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referents of these concepts constitute persons. In other words, even if the concept 
‘morality’ does not ontologically constitute persons, what this concept refers to might be 
a constituent of persons. However, how this can be so, is not vivid. Different concepts 
refer to different entities in the world, from humans, to object, to animals; and some 
concepts can refer not to the above entities themselves, but to relationships these 
entities may have with each other. Thus, when it comes to morality, I posit that it is a 
concept which refers to the behaviour of humans. Whenever one speaks about morality, 
they are referring to how humans ought to behave in defined situations. What the 
concept refers to can only be limited to the behaviour of human beings; how people 
conduct themselves. If this is the case, then even what these concepts, morality and 
communality, refer to, behaviour or conduct or orientation, presupposes the existence of 
a human being who can then behave in a certain way. And since, for Matolino, what it is 
to be a person is to have a metaphysical identity (to be a human being) and a social 
identity, morality and communality are just the kind of referents which cannot be 
constituents of human beings ontologically; they are only limited to a person’s social 
identity. To put it more crudely, since morality and communality refer to behaviour, they 
are essentially the kinds of ‘things’ which need for there to exist humans prior to their 
instantiation, which means that morality and communality are the kinds of properties the 
metaphysical ontology of persons could not have. This is probably why morality, in 
philosophy, belongs under the category of the normative, while ontology belongs to 
metaphysics. Ontology refers to the constitutive nature of what exists, and morality refers 
to how this existent operates or ought to operate. Therefore, in light of the above, moral 
agency and communality are not basic features of persons because there needs to be an 
ontological entity which has the capacity to behave morally and communally first, before 
this entity can be referred to as moral and communal. Thus, an ontological person is one 
who could not have moral agency and communality as constituents because these are 
not basic features. To make this claim the way Oyowe does appears to be a category 
mistake itself.  
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Another way Oyowe attempts to dispute the category mistake charge by Matolino 
is when the former accuses the latter of meaning, at another time, something different 
when employing the term category mistake. According to Oyowe, the other meaning 
Matolino gives when one commits a category mistake, derived from Gilbert Ryle’s 
example of a foreigner touring a university, and after being shown various departments 
of the university, the foreigner asks the location of the university, is, thus, when “one 
locates some entity in a category it does not belong” (2015: 509). In my view, however, 
to locate an entity in a category in which it does not belong is to attribute to that very 
entity, a property it could not have; these appear to be logically equivalent. To say that 
water is a solid can be viewed, on one hand, as locating it (water) in a category (solidity) 
it does not belong. On the other hand, claiming water is a solid is to attribute to a certain 
entity (water) a property (solidity) it could not have. Thus, it is not obvious why there is a 
need to separate these articulations of the category mistake. Nevertheless, Matolino’s 
position is still defensible even for the second formulation of the category mistake. 
According to Oyowe (2015), if the second formulation holds, then the “Afro-
communitarian’s mistake is that she locates persons in the ‘socio-moral’ category rather 
than the metaphysical category” (ibid). However, Oyowe is of the view that it is not a 
mistake like the foreigner’s to “locate persons in the ‘socio-moral’ category”. While the 
foreigner believes the University belongs in the same category as the departments, a 
wrong category, Afro-communitarians have not “placed persons in the wrong category, 
by virtue of placing them in the ‘socio-moral’ category” (ibid). This is because, for Oyowe, 
persons belong in both the metaphysical and socio-moral category, and hence, there is 
no category mistake committed. From my perspective, Oyowe seems to have slightly 
underappreciated, and thus misconstrued, Matolino’s sentiments. Matolino, if I am 
correct, would agree with Oyowe that persons belong in both the metaphysical and socio-
moral category. Indeed, Matolino’s entire book is dedicated to depicting what he views 
to be the most appropriate way we can talk about persons under the metaphysical 
category, and how we can appropriately talk about persons in the socio-moral category. 
This is evinced by how Matolino, in Chapter five of his book, proceeds to separate 
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between the metaphysical and the social identity of a person, further illustrating his 
commitment that persons belong in both categories. However, Matolino’s issue is the 
conflating of the two categories, by communitarians, as if they are fundamentally 
interchangeable. For Matolino, the communitarian’s mistake is not that they have located 
persons in the wrong category of socio-morality. Instead, I understand Matolino’s charge 
to be subtler than that.  
For Matolino, the mistake is that the communitarians locate in the metaphysical 
category, features of persons which belong in the socio-moral category. Persons belong 
in the metaphysical category because of their basic features (ontology), and they belong 
in the socio-moral category because of the capacity of these basic features enabling 
persons to operate and behave in certain ways. Thus, it is by having a body that I am able 
to interact with others and socialise – these two categories come apart – and as a result, 
it is not necessarily the case that when one speaks about the metaphysical constitution 
of a person, i.e. the ontology of persons, one has to refer to socio-moral categories to 
make sense of it. Therefore, to claim that communality, a concept referring to behaviour 
of an entity, and thus, belonging in the socio-moral realm, is an ontological feature of 
persons is to locate in the metaphysical category, features of persons which belong in the 
socio-moral category. In other words, to do so is to commit a category mistake.  
Oyowe’s third attempt to discard the category mistake charge pertains to 
Matolino’s request that communitarians show the community to belong in the same 
category as ontological features, like the okra (the life-giving entity), the nipadua (the 
body), and the sunsum (the bearer of one’s personality) in the Akan scheme, in the sense 
that they belong to each individual, and are physical or psycho-spiritual. However, Oyowe 
claims that to require this of communitarians “begs the question because it already 
privileges the set of constitutive elements of personhood identified by those who prefer 
the metaphysical approach” without showing through further arguments that this 
approach “is the appropriate way to characterise personhood” (2015: 510). Moreover, 
Oyowe finds it conceivable that the community be mind-dependent, like the okra and the 
sunsum, and hence belong in the same category. As a matter of fact, Oyowe is of the view 
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that if we accept ascribing to the okra and the sunsum categories like ‘quasi-physicality’ 
or ‘psycho-spirituality’, then we ought to be accepting of the same properties being 
ascribed to the community. He says, “The Afro-communitarian who says the ‘community’ 
is some psycho-spiritual or quasi-physical entity manifested in actual families, clans, and 
cultural or ethnic groups is no more incoherent and no worse off than one who refers to 
quasi-physical and psycho-spiritual entities like okra or sunsum as constitutive of a 
person” (Oyowe, 2015: 511). Thus, it does not seem like there is a difference in categories 
between the ontological constituents of a person, at least those in the Akan scheme, and 
the community.  
I am of the view that the first part of this third criticism by Oyowe is misdirected 
as Matolino argues extensively why the metaphysical thesis should be taken seriously 
(2014: 162-165), so to claim that Matolino’s request is “tendentious” and “question-
begging” requires further clarification. Regarding the second part of Oyowe’s criticism, I 
am of the view that to claim that the community does not belong in the same category as 
the ontological features of persons seems to be logically deductible. To object in this 
manner is to miss the substance of Matolino’s claim. Matolino is not asserting that the 
metaphysical thesis is not without its weaknesses; he admits that there are still debates 
around what constitutes persons ontologically, however, what cannot be debated is that 
there is an entity which can exist without the community but without which the 
community can never exist; and that is the individual human being. Moreover, it is Oyowe 
himself who argues elsewhere that the individual is metaphysically basic or prior, and the 
community is derivative (2013). If this is the case, which I also take it to be, then the 
individual gives rise to the community. This means that deductively, what constitutes an 
individual is basic, and the community is derived from it. As a result, it seems then that 
the community, being derivative, belongs to that category which differs from the one the 
constituents of the individual, being basic, belong. Moreover, since Oyowe admits that he 
is “opposed to the idea of community as a mind-independent entity” (2015: 510), his 
charge is largely dependent on how the constituents of the metaphysical person (the okra 
and sunsum) are not mind-independent “things”. However, if in the Akan scheme, it is 
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established that the metaphysical person is only a body, then it is not clear that Oyowe’s 
charge stands since the body is a mind-independent thing. Thus, it seems that Oyowe has 
not shown conclusively that the community belongs in the same category as the 
ontological features of persons. 
Therefore, it seems like the charge of a category mistake stands. If this is true, 
then it seems like there are metaphysical conceptions of persons as found in the Akan 
and Yoruba schemes, as well as normative conceptions under which the communitarians 
fall. This is why I can accept Matolino’s taxonomy regarding one conception of persons in 
Africa, and that is the metaphysical view. My minor issue with his taxonomy, however, is 
that it is unclear why he chooses to characterise the views in Africa as metaphysical and 
communitarian, as opposed to the former and the normative conception. It could be 
because there is no other normative conception of persons other than 
communitarianism, but he does not state his case so vividly. Nonetheless, this paper will 
make use of the normative category, working with the understanding that 
communitarians fall under this category. Thus, having sorted out the taxonomy of the 
different conceptions of persons in Africa, and in light of the category mistake charge 
which excludes communitarians from making metaphysical claims regarding the 
constitution of persons, the next section explores the normative commitments 
communitarians have about individuals and personhood. Even though I do admit that the 
communitarian view of person in current literature seems to be dominant in the 
normative arena, the above considerations are important to provide clarity of past 
articulations of this view, and to guide future proponents of the communitarian 
conception to be cognisant of the category mistake charge. This will aid mental resources 
to provide more philosophically sound theories of persons. Nevertheless, there is 
widespread agreement that it is the normative commitments of communitarians which 
are of greater philosophical interest in African thought (Menkiti 1984; see also Ikuenobe 
2006; Wiredu, 2009: 13). Hence, the rest of this paper focuses on the normative 
commitments and their plausibility. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter sought to delineate the different conceptions of personhood 
found on the African continent and showed that the best taxonomy is one which 
demarcates between metaphysical conceptions of persons and normative conceptions. 
Kaphagawani is the first to attempt such an exposition of these conceptions. He is of the 
view that there are three conceptions or theses regarding what a person amounts to. The 
first one which he attributes to Placide Tempels is the Force thesis; the second is the 
Shadow thesis which Kaphagawani ascribes to Alexis Kagame; and the third one is the 
Communal thesis which Kaphagawani posits as fathered by John Mbiti. Such an exposition 
is criticised by Matolino (2014) as lacking adequate analysis and hence is in error. 
Matolino (2014) argues that the force thesis should be treated as the communal thesis 
since the vital force Tempels speaks about is dynamic, and is realised in the social arena, 
and hence is more attuned with the communal thesis. Matolino (2014) also argues that 
the shadow thesis is best referred to as the metaphysical thesis since the constituents 
Kagame refers to exist independently of the community and belong to the individual, and 
as argued earlier, this is not equivalent to begging the question. The second attempt to 
elucidate on the different conceptions is by Ikuenobe (2006) who demarcates between 
the descriptive metaphysical, and the normative conceptions. According to Ikuenobe, the 
former conception refers to those features which are intrinsic to individuals ontologically. 
The latter conception, for Ikuenobe, requires individuals to abide by communal standards 
in order to be recognised as persons. Matolino (2014) takes issue with Ikuenobe’s 
taxonomy as the former is of the view that to call the metaphysical conception 
‘descriptive’ is misleading as it makes it seem as though this conception is less important 
than the normative view. As a result of his own concerns, Matolino (2014) provides the 
third attempt at naming the different conceptions of persons in Africa as the metaphysical 
conception and the communitarian conception. However, Oyowe (2015) seems not to 
agree with Matolino’s taxonomy as it makes it seem as if the two views are mutually 
exclusive such that communitarians cannot make metaphysical assertions regarding the 
constitution of a person. But if read closely, the reason for Matolino’s demarcation is that 
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he charges the communitarians of committing a category mistake when talking about the 
community being a metaphysical constitution of a person. Matolino argues that when it 
comes to issues of strict ontological identity regarding persons, any talk of the 
community, or morality, constituting persons would be to assign to an entity properties 
it could not have. Oyowe opposes this, and claims that it does not seem that the 
communitarian is guilty of any category mistake, in any of its formulations. However, I 
argued that the position advocated for by Matolino is defensible if we take the latter’s 
demarcation between a person’s metaphysical and social identities. In doing so, I showed 
that if Matolino is read as arguing that communality and morality are not metaphysical 
ontological features of persons qua metaphysical identity, then it becomes apparent how 
communitarians commit a category mistake. This is because they attempt to locate in the 
metaphysical category, characteristics of persons which belong in the socio-moral 
category. Thus, with this in mind, any talk of the community being constitutive of 
individuals must be outside the metaphysical ontological make-up of a person; but rather 
in the socio-moral arena. 
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Chapter 2 
The Community and Persons: The Debate Begins 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to give some background (although not exhaustive) as to the origins 
of the now widespread debate in the communitarian view of persons. I also seek to show 
that this debate is still wide open and not resolved by Gyekye’s moderate 
communitarianism.  
2.2 The Communitarian Conception of Persons 
One of the most influential philosophers in African theories of personhood, Ifeanyi 
Menkiti, in his article, Person and Community in African Traditional Thought (1984), 
proffers personhood as defined in terms of the community. In persons being defined by 
reference to the community, Menkiti draws the conclusion that “the reality of the 
communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever 
these may be” (171). This basically means that the individual comes to know herself, and 
develops all her metaphysical capacities through the help of the community. Polycarp 
Ikuenobe advocates this interpretation by declaring Menkiti to be meaning that “the 
attitudes, sentiments, and moral dispositions of individuals are formed by virtue of 
belonging to a community with requisite norms” (2006: 119). Furthermore, Menkiti 
claims that personhood is made manifest in the socio-ethical arena and hence is 
processual such that over time, an individual can become more or less of a person 
depending on the stage within the process of incorporation the individual locates herself. 
In other words, there are norms and dictates prescribed by the community to which the 
individual must adhere in order to be recognised as a full person. Menkiti claims that: 
“Without incorporation into this or that community, individuals are considered to be 
mere danglers to whom the description 'person' does not fully apply” (1984: 172), and 
moreover, because of this constraint, “personhood is something at which individuals 
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could fail” (1984: 173). Finally, in culmination of all the above, because of the importance 
of the role the community plays in the development of the individual, Menkiti places 
duties an individual has towards the community (what I will refer to as communal rights 
or duties or responsibilities or obligations) prior to the rights individuals may have; in 
other words, communal rights trump individual rights. He concludes by saying that 
“priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, and their rights, 
whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their duties” (Menkiti, 
1984: 180). In advocating the primacy of the community, and correlatively, communal 
rights, Menkiti started a debate around priority in the relationship between individual 
rights and the community. 
Kwame Gyekye strongly criticises Menkiti for the seeming over-exaggeration of 
the significance of the role the community plays in the individual’s life. Gyekye agrees that 
the community is indeed important for the internal and external development of 
individuals. He says that the individual “needs society and all that it makes available for 
the realisation of the individual’s potential, and for living a life that is most worthwhile” 
(Gyekye, 1997: 35). Indeed, for Gyekye, the fact that an individual finds herself necessarily 
within a community implies that persons are communal in nature, and since it is the 
community which provides the platform around which the individual is to orient herself, 
the community must be prior to the individual (1997: 39-40). Nevertheless, Gyekye 
proposes a moderate version of communitarianism which fully recognises the value of 
the individual as an individual. He says that his version is “the model that acknowledges 
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual human person and recognizes 
individuality, individual responsibility and effort. The recognition is most appropriate, for, 
after all, the naturally social human being has will, personal initiative, and an identity that 
must be exercised, if his or her individuality is to be fully expressed and actualized” 
(Gyekye, 1997: 40). In as much as the individual can be communal in nature, for Gyekye, 
her possession of other characteristics intrinsic to her nature diminishes the ‘power’ the 
community has over the individual (ibid). Moreover, Gyekye agrees with Menkiti that a 
person is an individual who espouses moral character, however, Gyekye questions what 
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morality has to do with rituals of incorporation. In fact, Gyekye accuses the processual 
nature of personhood, as elucidated by Menkiti, of being “bizarre” and “incoherent” 
(1997: 49). For Gyekye, it is not clear exactly when a person becomes more of, or a full 
person, because if it is understood as referring to age such that an individual becomes 
more of a person the older she gets, then this will amount to the notion that the elderly 
are persons, which entails that they exude moral character. However, this is not always 
the case. Gyekye reminds us that “surely there are many elderly people who are known 
to be wicked, ungenerous, unsympathetic: whose lives, in short, generally do not reflect 
any moral maturity or excellence. In terms of a moral conception of personhood, such 
elderly people may not qualify as persons” (ibid).  
Furthermore, Gyekye demarcates through usage of the Akan word for persons, 
between human persons and moral persons. The former is the human being while the 
latter is a human being who has displayed conduct which is morally praiseworthy such 
that it is possible to have a human being who is not a person (1997: 49-50). I will comment 
on this distinction later, but what is significant for now is that for Gyekye, an individual 
who displays morally reprehensible behaviour may not be recognised as a person but this 
does not mean she “loses her rights as a human being … or that she ceases to be an object 
of moral concern…” (1997: 50). Moreover, Gyekye’s view on individual rights becomes 
clear when he states that, “Personhood conceived in terms of moral achievement will be 
most relevant to the communitarian framework that holds the ethic of responsibility in 
high esteem: the ethic that stresses sensitivity to the interests and well-being of other 
members of the community, though not necessarily to the detriment of individual rights” 
(1997: 52). Thus, Gyekye seems to advocate for a communitarian theory which recognises 
individuals as having rights, and allows for self-assertion since individuals are 
autonomous. For Gyekye, individual autonomy is the possession of a will; “a rational will 
of one’s own, that enables one to determine at least some of one’s own goals and to 
pursue them and to control one’s destiny” (1997: 54), and since one shapes one’s life as 
directed by one’s rational and moral autonomy, then for Gyekye, autonomy is an intrinsic 
value. Gyekye’s case for individual autonomy is made stronger when he posits that social 
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and cultural reform are made manifest because of individuals who are able to distance 
themselves from the community in order to reflect and then instigate “revolutionary 
actions” toward their own communities. Moreover, Gyekye asserts that the value of 
individual autonomy must not be overlooked as it is because of such autonomy that 
ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were able to come up with 
ground-breaking ideas even in their confinement in communal structures. Thus, it seems 
evident that the biggest criticism Gyekye has against Menkiti is the latter’s lack of 
recognition of the value of individuality and all it comes with (autonomy, rights, moral 
capacity, rationality, etc.). For example, for Gyekye, to demolish or demote rights to 
secondary status is too extreme, and to think of rights as antithetical to 
communitarianism is plainly false. He postulates that “A communitarian denial of rights 
or reduction of rights to a secondary status does not adequately reflect the claims of 
individuality mandated in the notion of the moral worth of the individual. Such a position 
would be extreme and would be at variance with the moderate communitarian view that 
I think is defensible” (1997: 62).  
From the above, it seems that lines have been drawn, and sides have been chosen 
regarding which is prior, communal duties or individual rights. Both authors agree that 
the community plays a significant role in the development of the individual in terms of 
exercising her inherent capacities and providing the opportunity for the individual to 
pursue life plans and goals. They also agree that in African thought, the status of 
personhood is conferred upon the individual through the discharge of this individual’s 
moral actions, , not merely in virtue of being a human being. However, where they differ 
is in the relationship between the community and the individual in such a way that while 
Menkiti advocates for the primacy of communal rights over those of the individual, it 
seems Gyekye takes the position which favours individuality, or at least an apparent 
balance between the two.  
Motsamai Molefe, in a paper titled Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye Debate: Who is 
a Radical Communitarinism? (2016), posits that Gyekye’s pronouncement of Menkiti’s 
theory as radical is philosophically unfounded, and hence, a logical implication of Molefe’s 
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argument is that the distinction between radicals and the moderates is unjustified. 
According to Molefe, the reason why Gyekye charges Menkiti with being a radical 
communitarian is that the latter, as construed by Gyekye, over-emphasises the role 
played by the community in the life of the individual to a point where individual rights are 
no longer recognised. Molefe claims that “Menkiti’s analysis is considered […] ‘radical’, I 
think, in so far as it exaggerates this role [of the community] to a point where it can 
undercut or violate human rights for the sake of the community” (2016: 40). However, 
Molefe does not view Menkiti in this light but proposes that what the latter does is offer 
an alternative political system based on duties as opposed to rights, an alternative 
germane to African traditional systems. Molefe claims that “Menkiti submits that African 
societies function on the basis of what we owe to one another in a community, whereas 
a Western society tends to emphasise rights. It is crucial to highlight that Menkiti notes 
that an African system gives priority to duties over rights” (2016: 48). To secure his point, 
Molefe makes use of Jack Donnelly’s claim that human rights are a Western concept used 
to secure human dignity. However, Donnelly continues, there are other ways, prevalent 
in non-Western societies, to secure this dignity (Donnelly in Molefe, 2016: 49). Thus, 
Molefe submits, that all Menkiti does is to posit duties as primary in securing dignity, and 
rights secondary; Menkiti does not fail to recognise rights. Therefore, to call him a radical 
communitarian by accusing him of violating rights is unjustified. One may quickly retort 
and claim that by virtue of ranking duties above rights, means that rights are violated and 
hence Menkiti is, in fact, radical. However, Molefe responds to this worry and claims that 
the onus is on Gyekye to provide an account as to why rights must be recognised in the 
first place. Nevertheless, even if Gyekye does come up with this account, there are those 
who are of the view that mere recognition of these rights does not render Gyekye’s theory 
of personhood distinct from radical communitarianism.  
Olanipekun Famakinwa provides a conceptual analysis of the term ‘recognise’ and 
concludes that “Gyekye’s recognition of rights offers a weak support for moderate 
communitarianism” (2010: 70). According to Famakinwa, recognition can be interpreted 
to mean either “acceptance”, “being able to identify something or somebody”, or it could 
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mean “seeing”. The first interpretation is unacceptable as “no communitarian accepts 
individual rights as the ultimate value”. The second interpretation on its own is 
insufficient as mere identification of individual rights without further qualification of their 
‘special’ status is morally insignificant since such identification does not imply the rank 
individual rights possess when compared to duties. The last interpretation is also useless 
because someone can see something in terms of visual experience, but fail to ‘recognise’ 
it (ibid). This means, from my understanding, that even if individual rights exist and to a 
certain extent, are experienced, such mere existence or experience on its own does not 
give light to where they stand regarding the attempt to balance them and communal 
rights. Irrespective of the above, the search for a balance between these things seems, at 
times, impractical for there can be situations whereby the two clash and the only solution 
is for one to trump the other (Famakinwa, 2010: 70-71). Moreover, according to 
Oritsegbubemi Oyowe, to seek equality between the individual and the community is to 
restate the problem which is engendered by this relationship. Oyowe (2013) argues that 
Gyekye seeks a balance between the individual and the community in such a way that 
neither the community nor the individual is basic or prior. For Oyowe, "Ultimately, then, 
Gyekye’s position is that metaphysical equality between the individual and community is 
the most appropriate way of characterising that relationship, since it holds better promise 
in articulating a moral-political philosophy in which individual rights and communal good 
are equally recognized and upheld” (2013: 120). In other words, equal recognition is 
afforded to both the individual and the community. However, Oyowe contends that the 
problem of the individual/community relation in African Personhood stems from 
“assigning equal weight to the demands of individuality and communality” (ibid). 
Moreover, if this is the case, then it seems like Gyekye restates the problem rather than 
resolve it. Oyowe asserts that “if the original controversy was a function of equally 
recognizing the claims of individuality and communality, then how can a metaphysics that 
proposes equal regard for both, by recoiling from distinguishing which one is basic, take 
us further beyond the original dilemma?” (2013: 121). Thus, it seems as if the search for 
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a balance between individual rights and communal duties is neither practicable nor 
coherent.  
Perhaps this is why Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism ends up advocating for 
the primacy of communal rather than individual rights. Bernard Matolino criticises Gyekye 
for failing to make clear the distinction between radicals and moderates. This is because, 
for Matolino, in arguing for the importance of individuality, Gyekye does not show, firstly, 
how the radicals trump on “individual talent and originality”, and secondly, how the 
moderates are to exactly promote this (2009: 167). More critically, Matolino charges 
Gyekye of offering individual rights the same secondary status that the extreme 
communitarians do. Of Gyekye, Matolino has this view:  
This is a contradiction within his account. He wants to affirm the importance of rights and the fact 
that moderate communitarianism is equipped with the necessary structure to recognise them. But 
at the same time he, in a very puzzling manner, claims that the very same moderate 
communitarian society cannot allow itself to be obsessed with rights. I think it is fair to inquire as 
to what Gyekye’s moderate version will be obsessed with. Gyekye says it will prize harmony, peace, 
stability and solidarity. If that is the case I suggest that there is no difference between the radical 
communitarian and Gyekye. They are both not obsessed with rights and they value harmony, 
peace, stability and solidarity (2009: 168). 
This view is evinced by how Gyekye claims that if there is a clash between individual rights 
and communal responsibilities, “the community will have to take the steps necessary to 
maintain its integrity and stability. The steps are likely to involve abridging individual 
rights…” (1997: 65). Thus, Matolino’s concern that the distinction between unrestricted 
and restricted communitarianism, as posited by Gyekye, is not clear, seems to be 
substantiated by the latter’s own words. This is because Gyekye’s biggest criticism against 
radical communitarianism is that it does not afford the individual the status she deserves 
by ranking rights secondary to duties, but at the same time, Gyekye does exactly this when 
comparing individual rights against communal duties.  
Therefore, from all the above considerations, it seems that the communitarian 
conception of persons emphasises the rootedness in the community, of the individual, 
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such that the community is said to constitute the individual. Secondly, this conception 
appears to claim that personhood is realised in the moral arena where an individual’s 
conduct and character needs to be consonant with the moral values and norms of her 
community. Finally, it is the community which takes priority over the individual, thus 
leaving open the debate on how to best resolve the apparent imbalance in the 
relationship between the community and the individual. Maybe to account for this 
imbalance, communitarians can claim that individuals are metaphysically constituted by 
the community, such that an individual’s identity is constituted by wholly or partly, by the 
community (see Molefe, 2016). However, to see if this claim is plausible, it is imperative 
that one acquaints oneself with other conceptions of person which may view the 
relationship differently. 
2.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this chapter, I sought to show how the debate within the 
communitarian conception of persons began, and how it still continues. Ifeanyi Menkiti 
(1984), relying on John Mbiti, articulated a view of a person which posits that a person is 
defined in terms of the community. He claims that the individual is nothing but a mere 
dangler without a community, as the latter develops the former’s metaphysical 
capacities. As a result of the role the community plays in the composition of the individual, 
Menkiti claims that it is the community which takes priority over the individual, meaning 
that community rights trump individual rights. Gyekye (1997) opposes Menkiti by arguing 
that the community itself is comprised of individuals who are able to reflect on their own 
and come up with revolutionary ideas that can benefit the community. Furthermore, the 
individual is autonomous, and hence should have her rights recognised by the 
community. As a result of Menkiti’s advocacy for the abrogation of individual rights, 
Gyekye dubs him a radical communitarian while referring to himself as a moderate 
communitarian; and so, the debate as to how to characterise the relationship between 
the individual and the community begins. However, Gyekye has not been without his 
critics. Molefe (2016) argues that Gyekye is not warrented to call Menkiti a radical 
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communitarian because both these philosophers speak of rights without arguing for their 
existence in the African context. Molefe (2016) claims that it is plausible for a society to 
have obligations based on duties as opposed to rights, so if Menkiti had this line of 
thinking when he ranked rights as secondary to duties, it is not clear why he should be a 
radical communitarian for advocating a duties-based morality. Famakinwa (2010) also 
criticises Gyekye and argues that the mere recognition of the individual’s rights is 
consistent with radical communitarianism, making it unclear where the real distinction 
lies between the so-called radicals and moderates. Oyowe (2013) also brings to light that 
Gyekye’s offering the recognition of the individual as having equal status as the 
community, as a solution to the debate, merely restates the problem than resolve it. This 
is because, the existence of the problem is given meaning when there is recognition of 
the equal status of both the individual and community. In other words, it is because the 
individual is autonomous, has dignity and rights, that it is problematic for the community 
to trump her rights in virtue of the community playing a critical role in the development 
of the individual. Thus, to propose equal recognition of both these constituents of society 
is to restate the problem. However, Gyekye’s biggest weakness in his exposition is 
exposed by Matolino (2009) when the latter points out that Gyekye ultimately commits 
to the same side of the debate as the radicals when he picks communal rights over 
individual rights, when there is a clash between the two. As a result, it seems as though 
seeking a balance between these is harder than Gyekye once thought, and it leaves open 
the debate on the appropriate characterisation of the individual/community relation. 
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Chapter3 
Communitarianism, Personhood, and Morality: A critique 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to articulate what the communitarian conception of persons 
amounts to in the normative area, and then assess whether such a conception is coherent 
in its claims. 
3.2 Communitarianism: Persons as Moral Entities 
There exists the idea that to be regarded as a person, two things are needed: an individual 
needs to be morally excellent; and secondly, the way to secure this moral excellence is 
through maintaining good relations with others, meaning that one has duties directed 
towards others. In her recent article, Personhood: Social Approval or a Unique Identity?, 
Mpho Thsivhase argues for a demarcation between the nature of personhood and the 
means of acquiring personhood. She is of the view that “personhood is realised when one 
conducts her life in a way that is morally virtuous and, so, humanly excellent” (2013: 120). 
As a result, Tshivhase notes that the nature of personhood is the embodiment of moral 
principles “which are dominated by a concern for the well-being of others or conforming 
to community’s expectations” and the means of acquiring personhood is belonging to a 
community “and participating in the socializing process” (2013: 122). What lends support 
for Tshivhase’s view is how prominent African philosophers articulate the normative 
communitarian conception of persons. Polycarp Ikuenobe is of the view that although 
there are two conceptions of personhood in African thought, the descriptive metaphysical 
and the normative, it is the latter conception which closely resembles the traditional 
African setup, because “personhood is a status earned by meeting certain community 
standards, including the ability to take on prescribed responsibilities […] worthy of social 
recognition” (2006: 117). From this, it is apparent that personhood is a “status” of some 
sort and this status is brought about by adhering to “community standards”. Furthermore, 
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for Ikuenobe, it is clear that the entity upon which the status of personhood is conferred 
can only be a human being, i.e. the metaphysical account is a necessary condition for the 
normative account. He claims that “An object, X, must satisfy the descriptive metaphysical 
criteria of personhood before X can be evaluated and recognized as having satisfied the 
communal criteria of personhood” (Ikuenobe, 2006: 118). He goes on to claim that the 
normative account depends on an individual’s metaphysical capacities like “volition”, 
“autonomy”, “moral and rational deliberation.” What this means is simply that in order 
to be judged to have met the “communal requirements or standards”, and thus to be 
recognised as a person, one needs to have acted freely and voluntarily when acting out 
their duties (ibid).  
As a result of such autonomy, Ikuenobe is of the view that the status of 
personhood can only be conferred upon an individual when she abides by communal 
requirements through her own choosing; through her own autonomy. Moreover, 
Ikuenobe continues to say that a “A moral person must also appreciate the communal 
reality and must internalize the requisite attitudes and values of the community” (2006: 
120). From this, it means that the nature of personhood, or the status, is one of moral 
excellence. If personhood is a status, it means that to be a person is to be praised. 
According to Ikuenobe, in order to receive such status or praise, one needs to 
autonomously abide by communal norms. Thus, as quoted above, it is the autonomous 
adherence to communal values that renders an individual a morally excellent entity. 
Therefore, the status of being a person is moral excellence; to be a person, in such 
thought, just is, at the very least, to be a morally excellent human being. Moreover, this 
indicates, as Tshivhase postulates, that the means of acquiring moral excellence or 
personhood, is through adherence to communal values.  
Wiredu is also sympathetic to this normative conception communitarians have of 
persons. He is of the view that “a person is not just an individual of human parentage with 
a body and mind and a destiny who walks the earth. Additionally, a person must be an 
individual who satisfies certain norms (2008: 336). From this, in support of Menkiti, it is 
clear that for Wiredu, persons are “defined by the community” (ibid). However, this claim 
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alone does not make him an extreme or radical communitarian, but rather, what renders 
one extreme or radical is “the kinds of conditions that are set up as the criteria of 
personhood that may, or may not, be authoritarian or in some sense oppressive or 
unsound” (2008: 336-337). What is more is that not only does Wiredu advocate for the 
preference of the normative conception of persons over the metaphysical, he views the 
former conception as dominated by “ethical issues” (2009: 13). Furthermore, he is of the 
view that the nature of persons in African thought is indeed processual as Menkiti posited. 
Moreover, for him, “to be called a person is to be commended” (ibid). This means that for 
him, like Ikuenobe, personhood is a status filled with praise. This means, then, that to be 
called a person is to be evaluated and then praised. If this is true, then it makes sense why 
both Wiredu (2009) and Ikuenobe (2006) postulate that this kind of evaluation means 
that there exists a system of values against which the individual is to be judged. Ikuenobe 
claims that “The recognition of a person implies the existence of (satisfied) group 
standards for action and achievement. These standards, in turn, indicate a view of 
personhood that represents the social and moral identity one acquires” (2006: 118). For 
Wiredu, this system of values is made up of a combination of “strict” moral rules as well 
“broad” or “loose” moral rules. The former are those moral rules applicable to all human 
beings, all the time, and they pertain to the welfare of humanity as a whole. In other 
words, these are immutable (Wiredu, 2008). However, since these strict moral rules do 
not guide all behaviour and interaction within and between communities, there are other 
rules which guide, for example, where to take kids to school, and these rules, often 
referred to as broad moral rules, or customary rules, or communal values, do not apply 
to all people, but are limited to particular cultural communities. These customary rules 
are mutable and generally change with times. As a result, Wiredu posits that this “system 
of values presupposed cannot be anything short of an ethic for a whole society or 
culture”, however, since strict moral values are “constant, when people speak of an ethic, 
they usually have in mind the contingent rules of custom current in a given society” (2009: 
15). Therefore, for Wiredu, “In Africa […] the operative ethic is communalism” (ibid).  
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This, in my view, is quite enlightening. What emerges, then, is that to be a person 
is to be praised or commended. And since we commend only excellencies, then to be a 
person is to be excellent. Furthermore, since for Wiredu, personhood in Africa is 
dominated by ethical issues, it means that persons are excellent in ethical issues. In other 
words, when it comes to issues of ethics or morality, a person is an individual who excels 
at these. That is to say, a person is a morally excellent individual. Furthermore, Wiredu 
claims that communalism is a community or a social formation which highly values social 
relations, and the welfare of others. He is of the view that the emphasis placed in social 
relations naturally gives rise to obligations and rights, governed by another value; 
reciprocation. Wiredu claims “The normative meaning of this bonding [social relations], 
for an individual, is that she has obligations to large groups of kith and kin. This 
relationship is balanced, in the converse, by rights due to her from a corresponding 
multitude of relatives. The reciprocity involved was the source of a sense of human 
connectedness” (2009: 15). From this “sense of human connectedness”, individuals in this 
setup would concern themselves with pursuing the “interests of the members of the 
community” (Wiredu, 2009: 15-16). Thus, for Wiredu, a communitarian setup is one 
premised at least on three communal values: firstly, on the need to maintain good 
relations, which entails corresponding obligations and rights, and from this, the second 
value of reciprocity can be derived; thirdly, the final value is the welfare of others. 
Therefore, it seems that a communitarian person is one who is morally excellent within 
the context of that community. This is because the commending status of moral 
excellence conferred upon an individual who achieves personhood presupposes as 
criteria for the evaluation of individuals, a system of values which, as articulated above, 
is not strict moral values per se, but are the communal values. Thus, a communitarian 
person is one who lives according to the communal values of maintaining good social 
relations, maintaining the reciprocation of rights and obligations, and pursuing the 
interests of members – pursuing the common good as envisaged by Gyekye (1997).  
35 
 
3.3 Is this a Plausible Conception of Persons? 
Now that it has been established that communitarians view the nature of personhood to 
be moral excellence, such a view of persons becomes unattractive when we consider a 
number of difficulties it faces. Note that some of these difficulties are not knock down 
objections to the communitarian view of persons, but rather issues which need to be 
explained away. This view of the nature of personhood being moral excellence does not 
exclusively and necessarily belong to communitarians. What I mean is that it is consistent 
for individualistic societies, thought to be antithetical to communal societies, to view or 
define persons as individuals or human beings who are morally excellent. This means, 
then, that the communitarian view of persons is really communitarian in the way it 
defines what moral excellence is or how to attain moral excellence. In other words, it is 
conceivable for a liberal society to define persons as morally excellent humans, where a 
morally excellent human being is an individual who acts according to Kant’s categorical 
imperative. That is to say, in this individualistic community, a person is one who is a 
deontologist. However, this would not be the case for the communitarian society, 
because, to be morally excellent in this community, one has to live according to the 
above-mentioned communal values. Tshivhase puts it in this way: “The moral principle 
that should ideally guide an individual is aimed at improving and maintaining the welfare 
of her community […] Herein an individual’s conduct should not only avoid harming 
others, but should also help others to advance their wellbeing” (2013: 124). In other 
words, for her, personhood “involves a kind of human excellence that is characterized by 
the morally virtuous conduct that one displays within her community when interacting 
with other people” (Tshivhase: 2013: 125). Thus, this particular African view of persons, 
that is, personhood as moral excellence, becomes the communitarian view of persons 
only when moral excellence is acquired through adherence to communal values.  
If the above distinction between African normative conceptions of persons in 
general, and communitarian conceptions of persons in particular, makes sense, then 
there are three things to consider about the former notion: the individual moving from 
human being to a person; the system of values against which to judge the individual; and 
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finally, the judge. Much has been said about the metaphysical individual, and I shall 
comment more at a later stage. Regarding the system of values, there are questions which 
arise like who is responsible for coming up with these values, and how is this process 
facilitated? However, for now, I shall focus on the judging process, specifically the 
apparent uncertainty regarding how those who are to confer upon individual the status 
of personhood, the judges or other members of the community, are to do so. If for 
example, all it is to be a person is to be a human being, then all those who are judging the 
person-status of that human have to do is look for the species homo-sapien, and then 
they would know. It is quite easy to see a human being; this is probably why I have not 
come across anybody mistaking a human for a lion, or a bird, or any other species. One of 
the reasons why it is easy is because the criteria used is simple and not easy to fake; it is 
difficult to imagine a tiger posing in a human being costume. However, once the criteria 
to judge individuals involves a lot of factors, including value-laden ones, the process of 
judging, and hence of bestowing the status of personhood, becomes less easy, more 
tedious, making this conception unattractive. To understand why, it is important to 
remember that since individuals are judged according to some certain criteria, it means 
that it is possible for an individual not to meet these criteria and fail at personhood. In 
other words, one is being judged to be or not to be a person on the grounds of meeting 
or not meeting these criteria, respectively. This means that these criteria, adherence to 
communal moral values, are definitive of personhood.  
3.4 Inauthentic Moralists 
If the above is true, however, it makes it possible for there to be individuals who adhere 
to these values, and hence judged to be persons, but under closer scrutiny, it seems these 
individuals do not deserve such praise. Oyowe exposes this gap through his thought 
experiment called “the devious scientist” where he claims that: “Having recently 
discovered that personhood is attained by compliance to cultural norms, a very clever, 
but equally devious, scientist has recently programmed an otherwise non-compliant 
member of community to exhibit habitual compliance to those norms, thus generating 
37 
 
the appropriate moral and social recognition in terms of which personhood is conferred. 
His compatriots now regard him as a person” (2017: 3-4). As a result, if this conception of 
persons does not allow those who judge to “plausibly distinguish between genuine and 
programmed compliance [to communal norms], then it is less attractive for that reason” 
(2017: 4). However, Ikuenobe claims that a person must willingly and autonomously 
choose to adhere to these moral values in order to be regarded as a person (2006: 118). 
Irrespective of this will and autonomy, even if an individual can willingly choose to act in 
a certain way and abide by the required moral dictates, it does not follow that this 
individual wants to act this way, neither does it follow that this individual values these 
moral principles; in fact, the individual may abhor these principles but still abide by them. 
As Tshivhase notes, “moral conduct and an agent’s attitude are not always aligned, so 
that if we promote conduct over attitude we create inauthentic moralists” (2013: 127). 
To depict Tshivhase’s concern, Oyowe gives an instance of what he calls “the Janus-face” 
where “Obierika is an active member of community. He is widely recognized as exhibiting 
adequate compliance with respect to cultural norms and practices. But, unbeknownst to 
others, he is nevertheless sceptical of, and even abhors, these norms and practices. He 
sometimes expresses veiled criticisms and frequently repeats his aversion to them in the 
privacy of his hut, although he publicly complies” (2017: 4). As a result of the Janus-face, 
there is still the possibility of an individual who acts autonomously to comply with 
communal norms but still has a bad attitude towards them.  
A proponent of this view may claim that one’s autonomy must coincide with one’s 
attitude such that what one does autonomously, reflects their attitude. However, and this 
is my point, this does not make the job of anyone easier. The individual’s compatriots, the 
judges, are not privy to any internal states such that the assignment of personhood may 
be a huge mischaracterisation influenced by inauthentic moralists. Thus, for African 
thought to define persons as morally excellent individuals provides a daunting challenge 
of characterising authentic persons correctly, and this alone, even without the 
actualisation of inauthentic moralists, renders this theory unattractive. But as I said 
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earlier, this concern is not enough to disprove this theory; but the next concern, regarding 
the communitarian view of persons particularly, might be. 
3.5 Communal Values versus Moral Excellence 
As I said earlier, there are certain questions which are to be raised regarding the system 
of values that the communitarian view of persons is likely to have to explain if it is to be 
more attractive. However, that time has not yet come. As present, there is a conceptual 
issue regarding this system of values I wish to lay bare. As argued above, if we are to take 
Wiredu’s distinction between strict and loose moral values seriously, then it logically 
follows that the system of values that the communitarian uses to judge individuals 
against, refers to the second distinction; the broad moral values or communal norms. If 
these postulations are indeed plausible, it seems that requiring of individuals, in order to 
achieve personhood, abidance to communal values in order to secure moral excellence, 
leaves open the possibility of the communitarian dispensation requiring of individuals 
behaviour which is contrary to strict, immutable, moral values. In other words, it is 
plausible that a communitarian person be morally excellent with respect to her 
community, but be morally detestable with respect to humanity in its entirety. For 
example, if we take equality to be a strict moral value such that it is wrong always for 
inequalities to exist, then we would have to accept that equality among all genders is a 
strict moral value. However, there are communities which marginalise women and ill-
treat homosexual people. Such maltreatment of these genders is accepted in such 
communities, and to a certain extent, it is encouraged and an integral part of custom such 
that when dealing with certain communal issues, like that of familial succession, this 
maltreatment is practiced. In other words, such a disregard is a norm. In these 
communities, which were undoubtedly common in many parts of the world and still are 
in some parts, if we take the commitment of the communitarian seriously, then to be a 
person would mean abiding by the communal norm of disregarding certain genders solely 
based on their gender, which conflicts with the strict moral value of equality. Thus, it 
seems like this gender-discriminating individual is a person in his community as he is 
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abiding by communal values, however, he is quite distant from being morally excellent. 
Moreover, to require of individuals to be moral, whether strictly or loosely, is to require 
them to be other-regarding. For example, utilitarianism asks of individuals to regard the 
happiness of others in moral deliberations; deontologists, in their formulation of the 
categorical imperative, are required to consider if others would do the same when facing 
similar situations. Thus, it seems plausible that to be morally excellent is, on one 
understanding, to be other-regarding. However, in the gender-discriminating community 
above, to require, of individuals, to be morally excellent and adhere to communal values 
is to require persons to be other-regarding and other-disregarding, at the same time. 
Therefore, such an African conception of personhood appears, once again, quite 
unattractive. More specifically, however, the communitarian conception of persons, so 
construed, not only seems unattractive, but if my argument is successful, it also has some 
internal contradictions. 
Apart from these difficulties, there is still the difficulty of properly characterising 
how the relationship between the individual and the community should be. If we 
remember correctly from the first chapter, Menkiti (1984) and Gyekye (1997) provided a 
skeleton of what the communitarian conception of a person amounts to. They are in 
agreement that such a conception emphasises an individual’s rootedness in the 
community, or, from another perspective, they base their view about who counts as a 
person on how an individual’s metaphysical or ontological capacities are developed by 
the community. They also agree, at least if interpreted charitably, that their conception is 
one which is made manifest more in the moral (normative) arena than in the metaphysical 
arena. However, where they sought to differ is how they characterise the 
community/individual relationship. Menkiti outright claimed that the community is prior 
to the individual, and subsequently, duties towards others trump individual rights. 
Gyekye, on the other hand, criticises Menkiti for not fully recognising individuality, and 
sought a communitarian conception which attempted to balance this relationship. 
However, Gyekye himself ends up committing to the same characterisation of this 
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relationship when he claimed that individual rights will be abrogated if the community 
needed to, thus rendering him to conceive of personhood the way Menkiti does.  
Furthermore, African thinkers have attempted to put some meat on the skeleton 
by conceiving the communitarian view of persons to be claiming that to be a person, an 
individual needs to be morally excellent. In other words, to be a person in the normative 
arena, just is to be morally excellent. Moreover, as I have explicated above, to be morally 
excellent in the communitarian view is to abide by the community values or standards 
against which an individual is evaluated and then judged to be a person. Therefore, to be 
a person is to be an individual who adheres to the communal values of pursuing the 
interests of all members, maintaining good relations with other, and the latter entails the 
value of reciprocating either duties alone, or both rights and duties. Where most 
communitarians differ, from my understanding, is in the communal value of 
reciprocation. There are those like Menkiti and Gyekye who view the reciprocation 
principle as pertinent mostly in duties whereby members of the communities have 
alternating obligations towards each other, and rights either do not exist (see Molefe 
2016), or are secondary to obligations. Including Placide Tempels (1959), and John Mbiti 
(1970), I would like to refer to this way of viewing persons as classic, old, or traditional 
communitarianism. Now this view, as I argued above, seems unattractive for three 
reasons: the first is that it allows for inauthentic moralists which makes it difficult to 
accurately confer the status of personhood on individuals; the second is that it leads to a 
possible contradiction between moral excellence and adherence to communal values; 
and the third is that it disregards individual rights. As a result, there are those who 
attempt to revaluate the reciprocity principle and either search for a balance relationship 
between rights and duties (Wiredu, 2008), or they favour individual rights (Matolino, 
2014). Let us refer to these as the neo-communitarians, and we shall assess whether 
these new kinds of communitarians provide plausible alternatives.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter sought to provide an analysis of what the communitarian 
conception of persons in the normative arena amounted to, and also sought to show how 
this conception is unattractive, and is open to some incoherencies. According to Ikuenobe 
(2006) and Wiredu (2008), it seems as though to be a person in this scheme just is to be 
morally excellent. The way to achieve this moral excellence is through the adherence to 
communal precepts of maintaining good social relations; reciprocating duties or rights, or 
both; and the value of pursuing the interest of others. Thus, as Tshivhase (2013) points 
out, the nature of personhood is moral excellence, and the means of acquiring this 
personhood or excellence is throught allegiance to communal values. I then argued that 
if this is true of the communitarian conception of persons, then there are some difficulties 
in conceiving of persons in this way. Firstly, by requiring individuals to exude moral 
character in order to earn the status of personhood leaves open the existence of 
inauthentic moralists. According to Oyowe (2017), these are individuals whose behaviour 
is in line with the required communal values, but her attitude is in opposition to these 
values – thus rendering her compliance with them not genuine. As a result of these 
inauthentic moralists, it then becomes difficult to judge with a large degree of accuracy 
who counts as a genuine person. A second difficulty for this conception of persons is that 
requiring moral excellence through adherence to communal values seems to be 
incoherent. This is because it is possible for communal values to conflict with strict, 
immutable, moral values, a distinction provided by Wiredu (2008, 2009), such that to be 
morally excellent, an individual may be required to, on the one hand, abide by the strict 
moral principle of gender equality while on the other hand, being required to practice the 
exclusion of females and homosexual people in familial succession, of which the latter 
may be a communal value. Thus, it seems that the communitarian person viewed in this 
light has some internal conflicts, which makes this theory unattractive as it is. Finally, an 
issue with this conception is that it is committed to communal rights being prior to 
individual rights, thus supporting an imbalance in the individual/community relation. As 
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a result of the unattractiveness of this theory, there are neo-communitarians who seek 
for balance, or favour individual rights, as we shall see with the limited communitarians.  
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Chapter 4 
Limited Communitarianism: A Defence 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I seek to provide an analysis of what limited communitarianism is and 
whether it is plausible enough to withstand the criticisms mentioned in the last chapter, 
and other ones directed at it specifically.  
4.2 What is Limited Communitarianism? 
A communitarian view which I think is defensible is one articulated by Bernard Matolino 
in his book Personhood in African Philosophy (2014), which he calls Limited 
Communitarianism, which falls under the characterisation of neo-communitarianism. As 
noted earlier, Matolino demarcates between metaphysical and communitarian 
conceptions of persons in African thought. For him, metaphysical conceptions of persons, 
like those found in the Yoruba and Akan scheme, seek to articulate the basic elements 
which constitute individuals. As a result, he is of the view that to qualify as a 
‘metaphysical’ view of persons, a theory “ought to be free from communal considerations 
as primary constituents of the nature of persons” (Matolino, 2014: 72). Moreover, 
Matolino claims that, “Although all persons can be said to be social by nature; what makes 
them persons is the mere possession of these key metaphysical elements as opposed to 
sociality of any form” (ibid). Therefore, it is apparent that for Matolino, when talking of 
metaphysical views, he is referring to the strict ontological constituents of individuals. 
From this, it is clear that Matolino advocates for the metaphysical view of persons. He 
admits this when he says that: “Limited communitarianism is biased towards accepting 
and taking the metaphysical view seriously” (2014: 165). Moreover, he claims that the 
classic communitarian view of persons is grossly mistaken and ought to be secondary to 
the metaphysical view. He claims, “Had he [Gyekye] carried his analysis to its logical 
conclusion he would have rejected communitarianism as a basis of personal identity, or, 
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at the very least, he would have argued for the granting the communitarian view a 
secondary status in the view of persons” (Matolino, 2014: 111).  
As a result of the weaknesses of the classic communitarians, which are different 
to the ones I have expose in the previous chapter, Matolino provides an alternative view 
which differs from Gyekye’s moderate and Menkiti’s extreme communitarianism because 
this alternative asserts that certain individual rights are ought not to be violated, and its 
view of community differs from that of most communitarians (2014: 160). To provide the 
platform for his limited communitarianism, Matolino offers a few reasons why the 
metaphysical view of persons should be taken seriously. He claims, firstly, that it is true. 
According to Matolino, it is a brute fact that there are attributes inherent to individuals 
but which are independent of the community. These attributes, he continues, are thought 
to hold for all individuals and are responsible for how individuals operate in the world. 
This, in my view, is simply our human being-ness. The second reason he gives in support 
of the metaphysical view is that “it is free of serious incoherencies and alarming 
contradictions that besiege both radical and moderate communitarianism” (2014: 162-
163), and thus, and this is the third reason, the metaphysical view is easy to comprehend 
as it seeks to explain features whose existence is easily observable. In fact, for Matolino, 
such simplicity avoids any mystification of African, which then, fourthly, makes this view 
uncontroversial. That is to say that it does not profess to depict the African difference. 
The penultimate reason Matolino gives to take the metaphysical view seriously is that it 
is not dependent on the clarity of other assumptions in order to be complete. He says 
that, “It does not rely on any account of morality or on social organisation or acceptance 
of certain [other] factors as necessary to the construal of personhood” (Matolino, 2014: 
164). Finally, Matolino notes that the philosophising involved in the articulation of the 
metaphysical view is in line with philosophical discourse as it “is stated in strict 
philosophical categories of identity backed up by philosophical speculation and 
argumentation in support of stated positions. It addresses strict issues of metaphysics of 
identity” (2014: 165). 
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From this, it becomes clear that Matolino views or construes persons to be what 
the metaphysical view construes them to be. Indeed, he asserts that when it comes to 
personhood, “primacy must be given to the metaphysical view” (2014: 165). 
Nevertheless, Matolino does attest to the importance of the community in the life of the 
metaphysical person. He posits that his version of communitarianism “seeks to develop 
an account of personal identity that is not necessarily hostile to the reality of the 
community but also one that is not insensitive to the reality of the individual as a separate 
entity that retains certain distinct and specific characteristics” (Matolino, 2014: 166). As 
a result, when it comes to persons, Matolino is of the view that there exists two identities 
relevant to persons: a metaphysical identity as articulated by the metaphysical 
conception of persons; and a social identity in whose construction the community is 
involved. The former identity – the metaphysical identity – which Matolino refers to as 
the governance or possession theory, “holds that if any human being possesses the key 
attributes of, for example, thought, body, and an entity responsible for life […] she is a 
person” (ibid). The social or communal identity can be viewed from three conceptions of 
what a community can be. The first is where the community is construed as a social 
structure which functions in a way which seeks to preserve itself for as long as possible. 
Thus, individuals are expected to conform to social norms in order to ensure the 
maintenance and development of this community, and if she conforms to these 
expectations, then she is regarded as a person. To quote Matolino at length, he says: 
From this view we must understand personhood as a social function that has a certain definition 
and is restricted to the social expectations, which proceed from social structures, of how persons 
are supposed to behave […] If persons want to be social entities they must stick to these social 
expectations in order to be allowed in the opera of sociality […] It does not mean that ontologically 
such good social players count for more than the bad players. It really articulates the social success 
of these persons as opposed to any fundamental ontological constitution. We would all 
understand that being a good social actor which is called a good person is quite not the same as 
ontological count. So this perspective is essentially about how social structures perceive the 
function of persons to be within the greater view of social function (2014: 168). 
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This, then, is what would inform a person’s social identity. The second way to understand 
social identity is through the lens of the individual and how she views herself and her role 
in her community. If she understands her role as being one of obligation towards her 
community, then she will conform; but she is also free not to take such membership in 
her society seriously. Matolino claims that “If she chooses to take that membership 
seriously she will then seek to do those things that put her in a good standing in society 
[and] in doing all of this we expect that she has fully understood that she is a social player 
who is abiding by certain rules and those rules have a specific meaning for her” (2014: 
169). As a result, she will behave in a manner that would be affirmed by other members 
of society, which will, in turn, inform how she views herself. This view of herself, her self-
identity, is what Matolino argues be limited to a social identity as a role player in society, 
as opposed to viewing this identity as ontologically constitutive of her as a person. The 
final sense of social identity, for Matolino, combines the previous two senses of social 
identity where the community as a social structure imposes certain obligations on the 
individual, and the individual aligns herself with such expectations. However, Matolino is 
of the view that such “mutual recognition” between the individual and the community 
does not amount to the manifestation of the individual’s ontology but rather her social 
identity. He says that, “Limited communitarianism takes social identity as an identity that 
is born out of one’s reflection as a member of a particular group. Recognising that I am a 
member of this group gives me a sense of sociality, a sense of social orientation, a sense 
of who I am in as far as sociality is concerned. Limited communitarianism accepts social 
identity as long as it does not seek to make any pronouncements on ontology” (Matolino, 
2014: 170). Thus, it is more evident from the above that Matolino takes one’s social 
identity to be secondary to one’s metaphysical identity, as it is the latter identity through 
which one attains the status of personhood. Nevertheless, Matolino argues for the 
importance of one’s social identity as a tool for functioning in a certain way akin to 
communal expectations, as well as in political philosophy (2014: 171).  
From the above, it is important to note the philosophical moves made by Matolino 
in articulating his limited communitarian conception of persons. He firstly argued that 
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there exists a metaphysical view in African thought as illustrated by the Akan and Yoruba 
schemes. Such a view articulates the ontological constituents of individuals which belong 
to the individual. As a result, Matolino advocates for such a view of persons to be taken 
seriously and not be demoted to secondary status. This is why Matolino argues that 
persons have a metaphysical identity, as articulated by the metaphysical conception of 
persons, and also possess a social identity. For Matolino, the metaphysical identity takes 
priority over the social identity. This means, from my understanding, that all an individual 
needs to be counted as a person is to meet the requirements of the metaphysical view, 
which basically means that to be a person, all one needs is to be a human being. However, 
on Matolino’s theory, a person’s social identity is also important as it informs how one 
should operate the features delineated by the metaphysical view, in the social arena. As 
a result, the community constitutes not an individual’s metaphysical identity, but one’s 
social identity by providing structures and relations which give a particular meaning to a 
person’s existence and enables an individual to shape her life goals in accordance to the 
options provided by the community and how she wants to be viewed. Thus, from this, a 
person’s social identity allows the community to understand what kind of person one is; 
is she a good person or a bad person? Is she selfish or altruistic? A coward or brave? etc. 
Therefore, a person is made up of a metaphysical and social identity in such a way that 
when the ontological identity is combined with the communal setup, then it gives rise to 
one’s social identity; in other words, this combination of the community and ontological 
persons give rise to particular kind of persons. Of this, Matolino claims “in limited 
communitarianism […] the person as a social being is a role player. Whatever success or 
failure she registers in that role is not a mark of personhood but a reflection of her 
effectiveness or lack thereof at playing the particular social role that she is expected to 
play. To be an effective role player the individual must understand the rules of the game 
and she must accept these rules as binding on her and seek to advance her status in the 
game by continually excelling at the things that make her a good player” (2014: 171). In 
other words, an individual giving to the poor does not qualify them as a person but rather 
as a certain kind of person, in a particular social setting – a good person, or a kind person, 
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or a giving person – in other words, such a role she has performed informs her social 
identity. 
Now from this articulation of how Matolino believes persons ought to be 
construed, it is evident that his view dodges the first two worries faced by classic 
communitarians; that of inauthentic moralists and the judgement of personhood, as well 
as the worry of the possible contradiction in attempting to be both morally excellent while 
adhering to communal values. This is because, since Matolino’s construal of persons does 
not hand on judging the moral character of individuals in order to count them as persons, 
there is no difficulty in trying to ascertain who is an authentic or genuine person, and who 
is not. Since all being a person amounts to is being human, it is easier to judge who counts 
as a person since it is easy to judge what a human being is. Thus, even if there were 
inauthentic moralists, such vicissitude in character is irrelevant for the limited 
communitarian, as these individuals are already persons. Regarding the contradiction in 
the second difficulty, limited communitarians are unaffected by it because they do not 
require individuals to be morally excellent through abiding by communal norms in order 
to qualify as persons. For these neo communitarians, all that is required to qualify as a 
person is to be a human being; there is no moral requirement nor any other socially 
mediated requirement, hence why Matolino views the metaphysical conception of 
persons as “simple to understand” (2014: 163). However, even if the limited 
communitarians escape these two worried, they still face the difficulty of characterising 
the relationship between the individual and the community, especially in terms of rights 
and duties. 
Matolino takes the stance that individual rights trump or are prior to duties. From 
my understanding, there are two things which play a crucial role in informing Matolino’s 
stance: the nature of individuality, and the nature of rights. For Matolino, the individual 
is an entity which comes into existence without the non-trivial aid from the community, 
and neither does the community force the individual to remain a member; thus, she 
voluntarily associates herself with that specific community through the exercise of her 
autonomy. Moreover, Matolino stresses the non-involvement of the community in the 
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ontological make-up of the individual and asserts that this realisation should count in 
favour of the metaphysical view. He says, “If my distinction between social and strict 
identity holds, then we can say the primary determinant of personhood is the 
metaphysical view as it really seeks to articulate the elements that can be taken as strictly 
constitutive of persons” (Matolino, 2014: 177). As a result of the distinct nature of the 
individual metaphysical person, individual rights should carry a level of importance 
resonant in the metaphysical view of persons. Duties or social rights on the other hand, 
depend on a number of social factors like culture, the political regime, even geolocation. 
Moreover, for Matolino, an individual’s distinctness can be attributed to how her 
ontological constituents are bestowed on the individual by God such that they belong 
only to the individual. Therefore, Matolino adds that, “It is on the basis of this distinctness 
of the individual person […] that I suggest that there is reason to think that a person is an 
entity that has certain inviolable rights that cannot be trumped over in favour of the 
community [duties]” (2014: 180). Hence Matolino’s argument that: 
Community rights [duties] are born as a result of the outcome of negotiations between individuals 
and the community. Limited communitarianism takes it to be the case that the distinct individuals 
are ones who make the reality of the community. Through their voluntary association at various 
levels of sociality, they create the rules that govern not only those relations but the reality of 
everything communitarian. While it is true that every individual comes into a community that 
already exists and sees herself as embedded in the reality of that community, as I have argued 
above, her own ontological reality is prior to the communal reality. If we take each individual’s 
reality as prior to that of the community then there is no precedent communal reality to talk of. 
For communal reality to take root there must have been different accounts of individual reality 
that converge into a particular convention that is called community (2014: 183-184).  
Thus, from my view, it seems Matolino is claiming that duties take a secondary role to the 
individual’s rights because the former, as Wiredu (2008) postulates, are given rise to by 
the interaction between the individuals and their socio-political conditions. In other 
words, duties arise because of the conditions created by individuals, whereas individual 
rights pertain to individuals themselves. 
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4.3 Is Limited Communitarianism communitarian? 
Naturally, for holding such a position regarding the individual/community relation which 
favours the individual when it comes to a clash between rights and duties, Matolino faces 
stern criticisms. Oyowe (2015) argues that Matolino’s preference of the individual over 
the community begs the question of what makes limited communitarianism a 
communitarian theory of persons. Oyowe is of the view that: 
The challenge becomes pressing once it is seen that his view appears to be more at home in the 
liberal, or shall we say individualist, tradition as what is claimed here, and the metaphysical and 
normative status Matolino assigns to community in relation to the individual is very much 
consistent with many liberal theorists’ stance on the matter. To put it differently, if personhood is, 
unlike the conceptions Matolino rejects, to be characterised independently of community, and 
there is a secondary normative status for community in his scheme, perhaps, then, the choice of 
describing it as a form of communitarianism is misleading. Why cling to the communitarian 
designation in spite of the obvious liberal commitments about the status of the individual and the 
secondary normative place of community? (2015: 514) 
I am of the view that as it stands, Oyowe’s charge is unsubstantiated and hence 
unwarranted. Firstly, it is not clear what the liberal or individualist tradition to which 
Oyowe is referring actually amounts to. Moreover, as Gyekye (1997) points out, it is not 
the case that there exists societies which are completely communitarian or fully 
individualistic; both kinds of societies share resemblances, and the difference is a matter 
of degree. Thus, Oyowe needs to provide reasons as to how exactly Matolino’s stance 
leans more towards the liberal traditions as opposed to the communal tradition. To assert 
the preference of the individual over the community when it comes to certain rights is 
not obviously individualistic, especially if one is fully cognisant of Matolino’s tacit claim 
that these rights are not absolute. Matolino (2014) says that “The rights and freedoms I 
think due to the individual are only subject to curtailment if they are of a criminal nature 
seeking to bring unjustified harm to innocent people” (183), which shows that there are 
instances which make it permissible that the rights of the individual be suspended. As a 
matter of fact, not only does Oyowe fail to provide his own understanding of the 
commitments of liberal theories which would warrant his assertion that limited 
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communitarianism is individualistic, but Oyowe does not provide his own understanding 
of the communitarian thesis which would be juxtaposed against Matolino’s position, thus 
proving Oyowe’s charge. Therefore, it seems as if at present, Oyowe’s charge that limited 
communitarianism is individualistic as opposed to being communitarian is 
unsubstantiated, and hence unwarranted without further argumentation.  
Irrespective of this, even if more arguments are provided, I would still not be 
convinced of the charge that Matolino’s theory is not communitarian. This is because such 
a charge, from my understanding, hinges mostly on what communitarianism in African 
though amounts to. If we take Wiredu (2008; 2009) seriously, then as I argued earlier, 
African communalism takes the maintenance of good social relations very seriously, as 
was the case in traditional African societies. For Wiredu, “This [communalism in Africa] is 
a kind of social formation in which kinship relations are of the last consequence” (2009: 
15). Furthermore, Wiredu claims that social relations give rise to rights and obligations 
which are reciprocal. This is not hard to imagine. For example, the Enlightenment 
philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argues in his Discourse Upon the Origin and the 
Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind (1754), that in the state of nature, man 
would cooperate primarily for the fulfilment of his physical needs; the need to eat gave 
rise to individuals coming together to work hand-in-hand for the satisfaction of these 
needs. As a result of the cooperation these needs engendered, there arise duties and 
rights. For example, when eight people decided to get together to hunt down a wild boar, 
each was given a responsibility in the hunt; maybe four were given the duty of distracting 
the beast, while the others had the duty of killing it. In addition to these duties, rights may 
have also been distributed – for example, of the four in charge of dong the killing, the one 
who sticks the knife in the heart and deals the animal the final blow, may be given the 
right to take the first bite, and so forth. Therefore, from needs arise communities (social 
relations) and from these relations arise rights and duties. Thus, to take seriously the 
preservation of social relations is to take seriously the reciprocation of the rights and 
duties which arise from these relations. The final value I take Wiredu to be asserting as a 
precept of African communalism is the pursuit of the interests of the community (2009: 
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15-16). This value need not be taken as very complex. For example, in modern day 
societies, education can be regarded as an interest of the community (this is not to say 
that in traditional communities, education was of no interest) since communities seek for 
their members to be educated to such an extent that structures and institutions have 
been set up to facilitate the provision of education. Thus, someone who acts in a way 
which seeks to promote education can be seen to be in pursuit of the interests of the 
community. Therefore, although these are not exhaustive of all communal values, I take 
them to be the precepts around which all other values communitarians take seriously are 
conceived. Thus, from my understanding, what it is, at minimum, to be communitarian in 
African thought is to live according to the values of maintaining good social relations, 
reciprocating rights and duties, and pursuing the interests of others. Hence why Wiredu 
claims that from these precepts, “the corresponding conception of a person would be of 
a morally sound adult who has demonstrated in practice a sense of responsibility to 
household, lineage and society at large” (2009: 16).  
From the above, it is not clear how Matolino’s stance opposes communalism in 
any way; instead, it seems this is the kind of person Matolino would assert is a limited 
communitarian, as alignment to these communal precepts is captured by one’s social 
identity. In as much as Matolino views the metaphysical identity as prior to one’s social 
identity, Matolino explicitly states that the latter identity is constructed by the 
community. He claims, “The communitarian view would be the determinant of social 
identity as it articulates the social and communal views of what a person is. From such a 
characterisation, then maybe, we could move to a holistic account of what a person is” 
(Matolino, 2014: 177). This holistic account Matolino urges is, in my view, very important 
in how persons should be understood. Identifying what a person is seems not to be 
enough; to understand persons fully also involves identifying what kind of a person one 
is, and to conflate the two would be to commit a category mistake. It seems to me that a 
more attractive and coherent construal of the communitarian thesis, even in the 
normative arena alone, is to view this theory as providing principles which delineate a 
specific kind of person; a communitarian person. This understanding gives new meaning 
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to the phrase “a person is defined by the community”. This phrase can be interpreted as 
saying that the community provides specifications as to the kind of person one is or can 
become. This is similar to the claim that a car, a Jeep, is defined by its engine; the latter 
provides specifications (V6, 3.2 litres, turbo charged) of the Jeep; the engine allows us to 
know, out of the many Jeeps out there, the kind this specific one belongs to. Therefore, 
in light of the above, it seems apparent that one’s social identity provides others with 
knowledge of the kind of person one is. Moreover, limited communitarianism requires 
one to align one’s social identity with the communal precepts articulated above, thus 
providing an instance of a specific kind of person, a communitarian person. Therefore, it 
appears that the charge of limited communitarianism being kindred mostly with the 
liberal tradition because of simply favouring the metaphysical identity in the distinction 
between this identity and one’s social identity, is unfounded. In fact, I postulate that this 
distinction was very much at work in traditional Africa. This is evinced by the fact that 
Gyekye (1997) and Wiredu (2008) point out that in the Akan language, the word for a 
person, Onipa, refers to both a human being, or one’s metaphysical identity, and it also 
refers to a specific kind of human being – one “of a certain moral and social standing” 
(Wiredu, 2008: 16) – in other words, it also refers to one’s social identity. 
The opponent of limited communitarianism may insist and claim that it is not clear 
how the social identity of an individual is meant to capture the above-mentioned precepts 
on which the communitarian dispensation is built. She might say that it seems as though 
proffering the metaphysical as prior to one’s social identity means that through one’s 
metaphysical autonomy, one can choose not to promote the maintenance of good social 
relations, and also choose not to pursue the interests of other members of the 
community. While for the classic communitarians, the objective of becoming a person is 
what ensures individuals are good towards each other, how does the limited 
communitarian guarantee that she does in fact abide by the “rules of the game?” In other 
words, how does she ensure that she adheres to communal precepts? A way to answer 
this concern is by firstly pointing out that one’s metaphysical identity is prior when it 
comes to issues of personhood – a person is identified through their metaphysical identity 
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such that in virtue of this identity, or by virtue of being human, one is a person. However, 
when it comes to how persons relate to each other, then those are matters which rely on 
the social structure one finds oneself in, hence one’s social identity will come into 
operation. What needs to be understood is that the metaphysical and social identities of 
a single person work hand-in-hand in order to facilitate how one is to play her role in 
society; their existence is contemporaneous. To clarify how this contemporaneity works, 
the limited communitarian understands that through one’s metaphysical identity, one 
possessed dignity. In other words, since a person just is a human being, by virtue of being 
human, an individual is an entity with dignity. Furthermore, since this dignity rests on 
one’s metaphysical constituents or one’s human being-ness, i.e. this possession of dignity 
has nothing to do with one’s social standing, the limited communitarian realises that all 
members of the community, and humanity, possess dignity. As a result of this realisation, 
the limited communitarian treats others with dignity since all others are persons. Thus, in 
as much as the seat of dignity is one’s metaphysical identity, it is in the social arena, 
through one’s social identity that an individual realises that she is confined in a social 
structure where it is a good thing to respect others and treat them with dignity. That is to 
say, that one confers the status of personhood, and hence of dignity, upon another 
because of the other’s metaphysical identity. Following this recognition of the other, one 
then aligns her social identity with what she recognises in the other, and then follows to 
treat the other as deserving of dignity, and hence the limited communitarian maintains 
good social relations. 
4.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to defend limited communitarianism. In articulating 
his limited communitarian theory of persons, Matolino (2014) argues that persons are 
constituted of metaphysical and social identities. The former identity pertains to the 
metaphysical constituents of individuals which qualify them as persons. The latter identity 
pertains to how a metaphysical person operates (or ought to operate) in the social arena. 
For Matolino, since the status of personhood is conferred upon an individual because of 
55 
 
their metaphysical identity, it is this identity which is prior to the social identity of a 
person. However, as Matolino (2014) argues, this does not render one’s social identity 
any less important. Since this social identity is a function of the social structure and the 
options it makes available for the individual, it is through this identity that an individual is 
nown as a certain kind of person. If one shapes one’s social identity to be aligned with 
giving to the needy, then one will be reckoned by one’s compatriots, as a giving person, 
or a kind person, or a good person. Thus, for Matolino’s limited communitarianism, one 
is defined as a person by one’s metaphysical identity, and the kind of person one is 
depends on one’s social identity. As a result of this demarcation, I have argued that 
limited communitarianism does not face the ‘inauthentic moralist’ difficulty as to be a 
person is not determined by an individual’s moral behaviour. Furthermore, this view of 
persons also escapes the difficulty of being open to incoherencies between committing 
to moral excellence and communal values, because it does not require individuals to be 
morally excellent through adherence to communal values in order to be persons. Finally, 
in order to address the imbalance posited by the classic communitarians in their 
characterisation of the individual/community relationship, the limited communitarian 
thesis posits that certain individual rights are not to be violated by the community. This is 
because individual rights belong to the basic ontological constitutive elements of a person 
independently of this person’s interaction with others, whereas, communal rights are 
given rights to by this interaction. Thus, for Matolino, the relationship between rights and 
duties is reciprocal with certain individual rights inviolable unless their possessor has 
committed a crime against another innocent individual. As a result of Matolino’s 
characterisation, Oyowe (2015) charges Matolino’s view as belonging more to the liberal 
or individualist tradition than in the communitarian tradition. However, I have argued that 
Oyowe’s concerns are not warranted as he has not argued for his charge. Oyowe (2015) 
has provided neither his understanding of the liberal tradition, nor his view of the 
communitarian notion, thus his charge seems to have no non-trivial basis. Nevertheless, 
I have also argued that limited communitarianism is consistent with what Wiredu (2009) 
views the communitarian ethic to amount to. This is why I am of the view that Oyowe’s 
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charge to be unwarranted. Moreover, from all the above, it seems as though limited 
communitarianism is a defensible communitarian theory of persons.  
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Chapter 5 
General Conclusion and summary  
In conclusion, this paper has sought to defend the limited conception of the 
communitarian view of persons. The first chapter explicated the different African 
conceptions of persons and showed that the best taxonomy is one which demarcates 
between the metaphysical and normative conceptions of persons. Kaphagawani is the 
first to attempt such an exposition of these conceptions. For him, there are three 
conceptions regarding personhood. The first one which he attributes to Placide Tempels 
is the Force thesis; the second is the Shadow thesis which Kaphagawani ascribes to Alexis 
Kagame; and the third one is the Communal thesis which Kaphagawani posits as fathered 
by John Mbiti. The second attempt to elucidate on the different conceptions is by 
Ikuenobe (2006) who demarcates between the descriptive metaphysical, and the 
normative conceptions. According to Ikuenobe, the former conception refers to those 
features which are intrinsic to individuals ontologically. The latter conception, for 
Ikuenobe, requires individuals to abide by communal standards in order to be recognised 
as persons. All these expositions are criticised by Matolino as lacking adequate analysis, 
and hence in error. Regarding Kaphagawani, Matolino (2014) argues that the force thesis 
should be treated as the communal thesis since the vital force Tempels speaks about is 
dynamic, and is realised in the social arena, and hence is more attuned with the 
communal thesis. Matolino also argues that the shadow thesis is best referred to as the 
metaphysical thesis since the constituents Kagame refers to exist independently of the 
community and belong to the individual. Matolino (2014) then takes issue with 
Ikuenobe’s taxonomy as the former is of the view that to call the metaphysical conception 
‘descriptive’ is misleading as it makes it seem as though this conception is less important 
than the normative view. As a result of all these concerns, Matolino (2014) provides the 
third attempt at naming the different concetions of persons in Africa as the metaphysical 
conception and the communitarian conception. However, Oyowe (2015) seems not to 
agree with Matolino’s taxonomy as it makes it seem as if the two views are mutually 
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exclusive such that communitarians cannot make metaphysical assertions regarding the 
constitution of a person.  
But if read closely, as this chapter argued, the reason for Matolino’s demarcation 
is that he charges the communitarians of committing a category mistake when talking 
about the metaphysical constitution of a person. Matolino (2014) argues that when it 
comes to issues of strict ontological identity regarding persons, any talk of the 
community, or morality, constituting persons would be to assign to an entity properties 
it could not have. Oyowe (2015) opposes this, and claims that it does not seem that the 
communitarian is guilty of any category mistake, in any of its formulations. Oyowe is of 
the view that sociality and morality are properties that a person could have. Moreover, 
Oyowe believes that persons belong to both the metaphysical and the socio-moral 
category, and to locate persons in both categories is not to commit a category mistake. 
However, I argued that the position advocated for by Matolino is defensible by showing 
that if Matolino is read as arguing that communality and morality are not ontological 
features of human beings but are features which require the existence of some prior 
entity, then it becomes apparent how communitarians commit a category mistake. This 
is because they attempt to locate in the metaphysical category, characteristics of persons 
which belong in the socio-moral category. Thus, with this in mind, any talk of the 
community being constitutive of individuals must be outside the metaphysical arena, but 
rather in the normative arena. 
In the second chapter, I sought to show the commencement of the debate within 
the communitarian conception of persons, and how it is still prevalent in current 
discussions. Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) articulated a view which posits that a person is defined 
in terms of the community. He claims that the individual is nothing but a mere dangler 
without a community, as the latter develops the former’s metaphysical capacities. As a 
result of the role the community plays in the composition of the individual, Menkiti claims 
that it is the community which takes priority over the individual, meaning that community 
rights trump individual rights. Gyekye (1997) confronts Menkiti for over-exaggerating the 
role of the community, and rendering individuality subaltern to the community. Gyekye 
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argues that the community itself is comprised of individuals who are autonomous, and 
hence are able to come up with revolutionary ideas that can benefit the community. As a 
result of this independence, Gyekye (1997) argues that individuals should have their rights 
recognised by the community. As a result of Menkiti’s advocacy for the abrogation of 
individual rights, Gyekye dubs him a radical communitarian while referring to himself as 
a moderate communitarian; and so, the debate as to how to characterise the relationship 
between the individual and the community begins.  
However, Gyekye has not been without his critics. Molefe (2016) argues that 
Gyekye is not warranted to call Menkiti a radical communitarian since talk of the existence 
of rights in the African context has not been adequately argued for. Molefe (2016) claims 
that it is plausible for a society to have obligations based on duties as opposed to rights, 
so if Menkiti had this line of thinking when he ranked rights as secondary to duties, it is 
not clear why he should be deemed a radical communitarian for advocating a duties-
based morality. Famakinwa (2010) also criticises Gyekye that the mere recognition of the 
individual’s rights is consistent with radical communitarianism, making it unclear where 
the real distinction lies between the so-called radicals, and moderates. Oyowe (2013) also 
brings to light that Gyekye’s offering the recognition of the individual as having equal 
status as the community, as a solution to the debate, merely restates the problem than 
resolve it. The reason is that the problem exists because there is recognition of the equal 
status of both the individual and community. In other words, it is because the individual 
is autonomous, has dignity and rights, that the community seems unfair to trump her 
rights in virtue of the community playing a critical role in the development of this 
individual. Thus, to propose equal recognition of both these constituents of society is to 
restate the problem. However, Gyekye’s biggest weakness, as exposed by Matolino 
(2009), is that Gyekye ultimately commits to the same side of the debate as the radicals 
when he supports the violation of individual rights in order for the community to preserve 
its integrity, if the need arises. As a result, it seems as though seeking a balance between 
these is harder than Gyekye once thought, and it leaves open the debate on the 
appropriate characterisation of the individual/community relation. 
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The third chapter sought to provide an analysis of what the communitarian 
conception of persons in the normative arena amounted to, and also sought to show how 
unattractive this conception is, and how it is open to some incoherencies. For Ikuenobe 
(2006) and Wiredu (2008), to be a person in the communitarian scheme just is to be 
morally excellent, and the way to achieve this moral excellence is through the adherence 
to communal precepts of maintaining good social relations; reciprocating duties or rights, 
or both; and the value of pursuing the interest of others. Thus, as Tshivhase (2013) points 
out, the nature of personhood is moral excellence, and the means of acquiring this 
personhood or excellence is through allegiance to communal values. In this chapter I 
argued that if this the communitarian conception of persons is as articulated above, then 
there are some difficulties in conceiving of persons in this way. Firstly, requiring 
individuals to exude moral character in order to earn the status of personhood leaves 
open the existence of inauthentic moralists. Oyowe (2017) views these ingenuine 
moralists as individuals whose behaviour is in line with the required communal values, 
but their attitude is in opposition to these values – thus rendering their compliance with 
them not genuine. As a result of these inauthentic moralists, judging with a large degree 
of accuracy who counts as a genuine person, becomes ever more difficult. A second 
difficulty for this conception of persons is that requiring moral excellence through 
adherence to communal values seems to be incoherent. This is because it is possible for 
communal values to conflict with strict, immutable, moral values, a distinction provided 
by Wiredu (2008, 2009), such that to be morally excellent, an individual may be required 
to, on the one hand, abide by the strict moral principle of gender equality while on the 
other hand, being required to practice the exclusion of females and homosexual people 
in familial succession, of which the latter may be a communal value. Thus, it seems that 
the communitarian person viewed in this light has some internal conflicts, which makes 
this theory unattractive as it is. Finally, an issue with this conception is that it is committed 
to communal rights being prior to individual rights, thus supporting a skew in the 
individual/community relation. As a result of the unattractiveness of this theory, there 
61 
 
are neo-communitarians who seek for balance, or favour individual rights, as we shall see 
with the limited communitarians.  
The fourth chapter sought to defend a neo communitarian view of persons called 
limited communitarianism. In articulating his limited communitarian theory of persons, 
Matolino (2014) argues that persons are constituted of metaphysical and social identities. 
The former identity pertains to the metaphysical constituents of individuals which qualify 
them as persons, while the latter identity pertains to how a metaphysical person operates 
(or ought to operate) in the social arena. For Matolino, since the status of personhood is 
conferred upon an individual because of their metaphysical identity, it is this identity 
which is prior to the social identity of a person. This does not, however, render one’s 
social identity any less important. This is because it is through one’s social identity that 
an individual is known as a certain kind of person. Thus, for Matolino’s limited 
communitarianism, one is defined as a person by one’s metaphysical identity, and the 
kind of person one is depends on one’s social identity. As a result of this demarcation, I 
have argued that limited communitarianism escapes both the ‘inauthentic moralist’ 
challenge, as well as the difficulty of being open to incoherencies between committing to 
moral excellence and communal values. The reason is that limited communitarianism 
does not require individuals to be morally excellent through adherence to communal 
values, in order to be persons. Finally, to address the imbalance posited by the classic 
communitarians in their characterisation of the individual/community relationship, the 
limited communitarian thesis posits that certain individual rights are not to be violated by 
the community. This is because individual rights belong to the basic ontological 
constitutive elements of a person independently of this person’s interaction with others, 
whereas, communal rights are given rise to by this interaction. Thus, for Matolino, the 
relationship between rights and duties is reciprocal with certain individual rights 
inviolable. However, Oyowe (2015) charges Matolino’s view as belonging more to the 
liberal or individualist tradition than in the communitarian tradition. In response to this 
charge, I have argued that Oyowe’s concerns are not warranted as he has not argued for 
his accusation. Oyowe has provided neither his understanding of the liberal tradition, nor 
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his view of the communitarian notion, thus his charge seems to have no non-trivial basis. 
Nevertheless, I have also argued that limited communitarianism is consistent with what 
Wiredu (2009) views the communitarian ethic to amount to, thus showing Oyowe’s 
charge to be unwarranted. Finally, from all the above, it seems as though limited 
communitarianism is a defensible communitarian theory of persons.  
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